Who’s In and Who’s Out?
Can India’s Answer Help Us Determine
Who Qualifies for Affirmative Action?

ABSTRACT
Who should be the beneficiaries of racially targeted affirmative
action? In its Croson decision, the Supreme Court answered part of the
“Who Question” when it conditioned affirmative action eligibility on
underrepresentation. What the Court did not tell us was underrepresentation
of whom? The Court thus instructs us to select beneficiary groups by
counting heads, but leaves open which heads get counted where and what
categories to use.
By artificially separating what are necessarily related inquiries, the
Court left a definitional lacuna that lower courts have struggled to fill. Such
definitional issues matter because they often determine who benefits from
affirmative action. Yet, the inconsistent approaches and conflicting
outcomes in recent case law reveals the inadequacy of current doctrine to
resolve such issues.
While commentators have largely ignored the Who Question in the
US, recent comparative scholarship has drawn attention to empirical
methodologies used in India. In contrast to the particularized discrimination
targeted by Croson, India has explicitly adopted a societal approach to
affirmative action that relies on empirical data to identify subordinated
groups through sociological analysis. A recent amicus brief filed before the
US Supreme Court suggested that the US adopt India’s model as the answer
to our Who Question.
This Article critiques the amicus proposal, arguing that India’s
approach does not provide a workable solution. Nor would it be desirable
even if it could. Pressing the ambiguities of race would expose the
normative incoherence of affirmative action in a way that would prove
politically untenable. However, even if India’s model cannot help us
answer the “Who Question,” it does have some more modest uses. It offers
both a definitional tool to improve the categories we count with and a model
for allocating decisional authority between courts and political actors.

TECHNICAL NOTE
This Article weighs in at just over 29,000 words (29,551 total; 19,050
in text and 10,501 in footnotes; excluding abstract, table of contents,
and this note).
The Article includes several data tables that are presented in graphics
format. To view them in Word, please use the “reading layout” or
“print layout” setting.
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One evening in February 2004, Rocco Luiere went to sleep Hispanic
and woke up White—at least in the eyes of New York State. Luiere owned
a construction company that bid on state highway projects.

Because

Luiere’s maternal grandparents were born in Spain, his company had been
certified as a minority-owned business enterprise (MBE) entitled to
affirmative action set asides. After doing business this way for fifteen
years, Luiere learned that his MBE certification would not be renewed
because New York no longer recognized people of Spanish descent as
Hispanic. Denied eligibility for affirmative action, Luiere found that he
could not compete for state contracts. He had to lay off a third of his
workers and sell 30% of his equipment.1
Naturally, Luiere challenged the state’s decision. After hearing his
appeal, an administrative law judge noted that New York’s definition of
“Hispanic” conflicted with federal standards, under which Luiere still
qualified for affirmative action.2 The judge’s recommendation to reinstate
Luiere’s MBE certification was overruled, however, by the state program
director, who held that state-funded affirmative action was not bound by
federal definitions.3

Luiere then challenged the New York’s Hispanic

definition on equal protection grounds in federal district court. That court
denied Luiere’s request for a preliminary injunction, a ruling that was
upheld on appeal.4

1

John O’Brien, State: You’re No Longer Hispanic; Definition Excludes People From
Spain; Established Local Contractor Pay the Price, POST-STANDARD, June 13, 2004, A1.
2
See In re: Appeal of Jana-Rock Construction, Recommended Order of James F.
Horan, New York State Department of Economic Development, Division of Minority and
Women’s Business Development, April 5, 2004, at 7-8.
3
O’Brien, supra note 1.
4
Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 5:04-CV-635,
Memorandum-Decision and Order, Oct. 28, 2004 (N.D.N.Y.), at 36-37; 2006 U.S. App.
Lexis 4050.
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Luiere’s case throws into sharp relief an aspect of affirmative action
rarely debated: Who should be its beneficiaries?5 There are at least two
aspects to this question: (1) selection: which racial/ethnic groups qualify?6
and (2) definition: what constitutes the boundaries of such groups?7 This
Article will refer to these problems, respectively, as the “selection question”
and “definition question” and collectively as the “Who Question.” It will
also address a meta-question: namely, who decides the Who Question?8
The 1989 landmark decision by the US Supreme Court in Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co. dealt with the selection question by conditioning
affirmative action eligibility upon a showing of underrepresentation.9 The
Court held that underrepresentation serves to identify discrimination that, in
5

See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV.
855 (1995) (noting dearth of previous scholarship). This Article focuses on voluntary
affirmative action, as opposed to court-ordered remedies. While some of the analysis here
will doubtless bear on the latter case, a court’s equitable powers to craft a remedy present a
very different normative context.
6
Despite the frequent inclusion of women and/or veterans in affirmative action, this
Article focuses solely on racial/ethnic beneficiaries. Veterans present less classificatory
challenges, as dispositive government records are generally available. Classification by
gender is also less problematic than race. See Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, 302 (1978) (Opinion of Powell, J.). This is not to say that gender
never presents classificatory ambiguities in affirmative action. Hayward Lee, a private
consultant on MBE certification, describes a case in which a post-operative transsexual’s
eligibility came under challenge. Telephone Interview with Hayden Lee of Lee Associates
in San Francisco, CA (January 28, 1998).
7
In particular, this article focuses on definitional choices which determine which
subgroups get included in standard racial categories: For example, are Iberians
“Hispanic”? For reasons of space, it will set aside the classificatory challenges posed by
individuals of mixed racial ancestry, cf. DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting the lack of objective criteria to determine individual identities), as well
as the procedural problems of determining who gets placed in which box. Cf. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (addressing procedural
challenges). In considering the Who Question, however, one should recognize that all of
these dimensions are at play.
8
In Luiere’s case, the question “who decides?” was framed both as a conflict between
state vs. federal standards and between courts vs. policy-makers.
9
488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989). To this extent, the Court also answers the meta-question
by staking out a controlling role for the judiciary to regulate the Who Question through
constitutional interpretation. Technically, Croson’s holding only applies to affirmative
action to remedy past discrimination. However, a similar methodology of “counting”
applies under a diversity rationale with no more clarity regarding whom to count. See
Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of What?, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 129, 130 (1996).
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a particularized context, can legitimate a racially targeted remedy. What the
Court did not tell us was underrepresentation of whom? In other words, the
Court instructs us to select beneficiaries by counting heads, while leaving
open the definitional question of which heads get counted in which column
or even what the categories should be.10
Rocco Luiere’s case highlights the problems posed by this lacuna:
Are Iberians counted as White or Hispanic? And why is Hispanic the
operative group, as opposed to, e.g., Mexican-Americans or Puerto Ricans?
Such decisions matter. Underrepresentation analysis represents a black box
whose output is only as reliable as the data that goes in. Furthermore, the
categories we choose ultimately control who benefits.

By offering a

numerical formula to select beneficiaries while ignoring these definitional
issues, the Supreme Court thus artificially separates what are necessarily
related inquiries.
Largely ignored by scholars, lower courts have struggled to fill this
definitional void.

Increasingly confronted with challenges to the racial

categories that define eligibility, courts have been forced to wrestle with the
ambiguous nature of racial identities. Canvassing this hitherto unexplored
body of case law reveals the many ways in which courts have begun to
challenge the popular consensus on race.

Such critical scrutiny raises

concerns that our current racial “map” may be inaccurate and outdated. At
the same time, the inconsistent approaches and the conflicting outcomes of
these cases underscore the inadequacy of current doctrine to deal with this
fundamental problem.11
For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that including
Iberians-Americans like Rocco Luiere in affirmative action violated the

10
11

The Court did offer some cryptic hints. See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
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narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.12 Defining a “Hispanic” category
this way was deemed overinclusive. Judges in the Eleventh Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion—on the same question.13 Meanwhile, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that counting only Mexican-Americans could be
underinclusive.14
Our uncertain approach to the Who Question has important real
world consequences that transcend mere definitional ambiguities.

The

original beneficiaries of affirmative action, African-Americans, now
constitute a minority among minorities, while affirmative action benefits
go—disproportionately15—to newer immigrant groups instead. Croson’s
insistence on particularized underrepresentation also penalizes groups such
as Native Americans whose numbers are often too small to generate
statistically meaningful evidence.

Conversely, counting with broad

categories leads to other problems. For example, because Asians as a whole
are no longer underrepresented in higher education, Asian subgroups who
are underrepresented are denied affirmative action.16
These problems are symptomatic of the larger failure of equality
discourse to look beyond Black and White and acknowledge the full
12

Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Cook Cty, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Peightal v. Metropolitan. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994).
14
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 n.37 (5th Cir. 1996).
15
In 1993, Black-owned construction companies received less than a fifth of federal
highway set-asides, and in 1996 garnered only a third of the SBA minority business
funding—less than the share of their proportional representation among US minorities
would justify and roughly half their share from a decade earlier. Asian-Americans claimed
almost as much SBA money as African-Americans despite having half the population.
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM: COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 164 (2002); see also George
R. LaNoue, The Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy, 61 ALBANY L.
REV. 1 (1997) (noting slower growth rate of Black-owned minority businesses compared to
other minorities will mean continued decline in African-American share of MBE benefits);
Malamud, supra note xx, at 321 (describing the predominant share of minority scholarships
going to nonblacks); Graham, supra this note, at 192, 197 (describing how many employers
have added “diversity” to their workforce by hiring Hispanic or Asian immigrants at the
expense of African-Americans).
16
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
13
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spectrum of ethnic color in America.17 Existing racial taxonomies have
grown inadequate to deal with the complexities of our diverse population.
Yet, the paradigmatic role of African-Americans in debates over racial
equality often masks the ambiguities posed by other groups.18 Meanwhile,
constitutional discourse on equality operates at a level of abstraction in
which the Who Question is bypassed entirely.19
Recently, commentators have begun to look elsewhere for fresh
ideas on affirmative action. In particular, India has attracted the attention of
both leading constitutional law scholars20 and social scientists.21 In contrast
to the particularized discrimination targeted by Croson, India has explicitly
adopted a societal approach to affirmative action that Croson rejected. By
reconceptualizing affirmative action as a project dedicated to eradicating
societal hierarchies, India not only illustrates “the path not taken” in the US,
it offers a working model of the anti-subordination approach to equality
long advocated by constitutional scholars and critical race theorists.22
Selecting beneficiaries under this approach becomes an exercise in
locating patterns of disadvantage. Intriguingly, India has developed a
sophisticated methodology to identify subordinated groups through

17

Alex Saragoza, et. al., History and Public Policy: Title VII and the Use of the
Hispanic Classification, 5 LA RAZA L. J. 1, 4-10 (1992).
18
Id.; Daniel Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV.
893, 894 (1994); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It’s Not Just Black and
White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 962-64 (1995).
19
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1311, 1313 (1999).
20
E.g. id.; Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary
Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV 649 (2004).
21
Clark D. Cunningham, Glenn C. Loury, & John David Skrentny et al., Passing Strict
Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835
(2002) [Hereinafter the amicus scholars]; SUNITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE:
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA
(1997).
22
Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava- Menon, Race, Class, Caste . . .? Rethinking
Affirmative Action, 97 MICH L. REV. 1296, 1302-1305 (1999); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
“Our Constitution is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 n.184 (1991).
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empirical analysis. India thus illustrates a sociologically targeted answer to
the Who Question that the US could learn from.23
A recent amicus brief filed by comparative scholars before the US
Supreme Court explicitly advocated that the US adopt India’s societal
approach to the Who Question.24 This Article critiques the amicus scholars’
proposal—and, by extension, the broader literature on anti-subordination—
by examining the practical and normative difficulties in implementing such
a model. It argues that India’s approach does not provide a workable basis
to select beneficiaries, nor would it be desirable even if it could.25
Whereas critical scholars often attribute the “decontextualized”
reading of racial equality in Supreme Court precedent to ideological
hostility to race-consciousness,26 this Article will argue that with regard to
the Who Question the opposite applies. Pressing the ambiguities of race
would expose the normative incoherence of affirmative action in a way that
would prove politically untenable. The Court therefore deflects the Who
Question in order to preserve the status quo under which affirmative action
can continue to function.27
That said, strict scrutiny does not permit such definitional issues to
be bypassed entirely. The Supreme Court’s avoidance of the Who Question
has led to doctrinal confusion among the lower judiciary. This Article
suggests an analytic framework to improve on our current approach. In this
regard, it proposes some modest applications of the Indian model, both as a
23

See LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA: DEFINING
THE DISADVANTAGED (2003); MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE
BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984).
24

Brief Amicus Curiae of Social Science and Comparative Law Scholars in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 2000 U.S. Briefs 730 (June 1, 2001). Three of these scholars
expanded upon the insights of their brief in a law review article. Cunningham, Loury, &
Skrentny, supra note 18. Citations to “the amicus scholars” will refer to this latter work.
25
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g. Gotanda, supra note 19, at 46.
27
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
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definitional tool and as a means of allocating decisional authority to decide
the “Who Question.”28
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I begins with an overview
of the ambiguous and contested nature of the racial/ethnic categories and
presents empirical data demonstrating inconsistencies in the racial
definitions used in affirmative action. It then traces the historical origins of
affirmative action and shows that both the development of race-conscious
government policies as well as the categories used to implement them
occurred more in the manner of ad hoc improvisation than through any
guiding principle or intent. Part I next explores how constitutional equality
law has responded, from the Supreme Court’s agnosticism on the selection
question to its virtual silence on the definition question, leaving in place a
popular consensus approach to race by default. Using US Census data to
demonstrate the internal heterogeneity of standard racial categories, Part I
challenges this popular consensus and calls into question their utility for
allocating affirmative action remedies.

Finally, it demonstrates the

confusion that has resulted as lower courts have attempted to redefine race
“functionally” in a manner that comports with the narrow tailoring
requirements of strict scrutiny.
Part II then introduces the Indian model as a possible alternative
approach. It illustrates how the model might be applied in practice to the
US context, again using Census data to dissect racial categories socioeconomically by subgroup.
demographic challenges.

Doing so raises both methodological and

In particular, Part II highlights the uncertain

connection between immigration and ethnic disadvantage.
explores prudential risks in embracing Indian methodology.

Part II also
The Who

Question can be divisive; it can heighten race-consciousness in ways that
28

See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
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may have unintended repercussions.

Furthermore, the normative

incoherency of US affirmative action limits our ability to answer the Who
Question with any precision.

Forced attempts at clarity might prove

counterproductive. Ultimately, Part II argues that the Supreme Court’s
avoidance of the Who Question rests on a political calculus in which
ambiguity represents the price of our continued commitment to raceconscious affirmative action.
The argument for ambiguity, however, is not absolute.

Part III

explores the need to strike a balance between competing jurisprudential
concerns. Recent case law threatens to make continued avoidance of the
Who Question untenable. As lower court begin to take a skeptical look at
the categories used to allocate affirmative action remedies, the prudential
tradeoffs between clarity and ambiguity will need to be addressed. Even if
India’s model cannot answer our Who Question, it could still help us
improve on the status quo. To this end, Part III proposes some practical
applications of Indian methodology with regard to the definitional issues of
race: It argues for a more differentiated analysis of ethnic subgroups and
local context and encourages consideration of systemic disadvantage as a
threshold test to improve the categories we count with. Part III also reflects
on the meta-question of whether courts should “constitutionalize” the Who
Question or leave it to political bodies to muddle through. It considers
India’s hybrid approach of “bounded discretion” as a possible solution.
Following Part III, the Article concludes.
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I.

Categorical Confusion and Constitutional Silences
A.

Identities in Flux

Rocco Luiere’s experience is hardly unique.

The Hispanic

classification varies across jurisdictions; even within the same region,
different entities may recognize different groups.29

The definitional

boundaries of Hispanic-ness have already been litigated in several
affirmative action contexts, with the inclusion of Iberian-Americans proving
particularly contentious.30

San Francisco’s Civil Service Commission

fielded an especially heated debate on the issue. Advocates of a narrow
definition argued that, far from being historically oppressed, Spaniards were
responsible for the destruction of indigenous cultures in Latin America.
Opponents countered by stressing the historical ties of language and culture
that Spaniards shared with other Hispanics.31 The two sides also disputed
the extent to which Iberians experience the same discriminatory animus
directed against Latinos. The anti-Iberian camp contended that the paler
complexion and European features of Iberians allowed them to blend in
with the White majority.

Iberian defenders emphasized characteristic

accents and surnames that mark Iberians as Hispanic and expose them to
prejudice.32

29

See Table I (illustrating variation in Hispanic definitions across jurisdictions). The
data presented are drawn primarily from a survey of municipal MBE programs conducted
in 2004 by and on file with the author.
30
See infra notes xx and accompanying text.
31
Alex Saragoza, et. al., supra note xx, at 2.
32
This argument had prevailed a decade earlier when Iberian contractors successfully
lobbied for inclusion in federal affirmative action set-asides. Prior to that point, the
Hispanic category had generally been thought of as including Europeans. See infra notes
xxx and accompanying text.
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Table I - Who is Hispanic?
Name of Jurisdiction
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Miami
New York
Oakland*
Richmond*
San Francisco*
San Jose*
Small Business Administration
US Census**
Stanford University
Univ. of Texas

+

Spaniards
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Portuguese
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Other Latin American
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Only Mexican-American and Puerto Rican

No

No

Only Mexican-American
** US Census treats Hispanic classification as an
ethnic identity independent of its racial categories

* Pre 1996
+
Pre 1995

Nor are Hispanics the only affirmative action group to inspire such
definitional debates. The boundaries of the “Asian Pacific” classification
are equally variable and contested.33

Ohio courts fielded a flurry of

litigation when the state MBE program decided that contractors from India
and Lebanon no longer qualified.

The case of Lebanese-American

contractor Nadim Ritchey went all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court. (He
lost).34

Oregon administrators wrestled with similar ambiguity when a

Kazakhstani contractor claimed eligibility.35
Even African-American has become a contested category.
Commentators have questioned whether Black immigrants should qualify
for affirmative action. This debate was fueled by recent studies showing

33

Formal definitions of the “Asian” category vary widely.
Some exclude
Subcontinental Asians or Filipinos; others out leave Pacific Islanders and/or Native
Hawaiians. Some include Afghanis; the city of Charlotte also included Persians. See
McGowan, supra note xx, at 130; George LaNoue, Standards for the Second Generation of
Croson-Inspired Studies, 26 URBAN LAWYER 485, 491 (1994).
34
Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871, 927 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1999). The
federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had the last laugh, however, striking down the entire
MBE program as unconstitutional. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d
730 (6th Cir. 2000).
35
Telephone Interview with Jill Miller, Certification Specialist, Oregon Office of
Minority, Women, & Emerging Small Business, Portland, Oregon (May 27, 2004).
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that 40% of African-American students admitted at Harvard and other elite
universities were immigrants or children of immigrants.36 Studies have also
shown that employers in New York City are much more willing to hire
Jamaicans and Africans than non-immigrant Blacks.37 “African-ness” is
itself contested. Teresa Heinz Kerry faced ridicule for implying that her
(Caucasian) Africaner heritage made her “African-American.”38 Yet, racial
distinctions in Africa are not always so clear-cut.

Affirmative action

programs typically define Black Americans in circular fashion as descended
from “black racial groups.”39 MBE programs have therefore struggled to
decide whether Sudanese and Ethiopians qualify as “Black.”40
Meanwhile, other ethnic groups currently classified as White have
sought “minority” status in part to gain inclusion in affirmative action.
While Middle-Eastern-Americans lobbied unsuccessfully for census
recognition in 2000, they did win eligibility for affirmative action in San
Francisco. French-Acadians were eligible in Louisiana. City University of
New York at one point recognized Italian-Americans.41

Congress

championed rural Appalachian Whites as equally deserving.42 And while
Hasidic Jews failed to win recognition from the Small Business
Administration (SBA), they are included in other federal affirmative action

36

Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which Ones,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004 at A1.
37
See Jennifer Lee, The Racial and Ethnic Meaning Behind Black, in John David
Skrentny, ed., COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 184 (2001) [Hereinafter, Color Lines].
38
Maureen Dowd, Out of Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at 14.
39
E.g. 49 C.F.R. pt. 26 (199); 13 C.F.R. 124.103.
40
Interview with Hayden Lee, supra note xx. Cf. The World Notices Darfur, THE
ECONOMIST, July 31, 2004, at 39 (describing racial ambiguities in Darfur).
41
DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING “RACE” AND “ETHNICITY” IN AMERICA 67 (2003).
42
See George LaNoue & John Sullivan, Presumptions for Preferences: The Small
Business Administration’s Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action, 6 J. POL’Y
HIST. 439, 443 (1994) [hereinafter Presumptions] (describing legislative history to
Congressional authorization of federal MBE program).
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contexts.43
As America’s population grows ever more diverse, such categorical
conundrums will continue to multiply. At root lies the simple fact that race
and ethnicity are not biological absolutes, but social constructions whose
contours are amorphous, contingent, and inherently contestable.44 As one
court summarized: “Race is politics, not biology.”45 It may be tempting to
dismiss such definitional disputes as the normal cut and thrust of identity
politics. Yet, as Rocco Luiere reminds us, there are tangible benefits at
stake on which people’s livelihoods depend. Administrators of affirmative
action programs have to wrestle with the uncertainties and ambiguities of
race to determine who’s in . . . and who’s out.
Increasingly, such disputes are finding their way into the courts. If
you’re a judge assigned to such a case, how do you decide? What does it
mean, e.g., to be “Hispanic” for purposes of affirmative action? Faced with
such questions, courts have tried all manner of approaches: They have
consulted dictionaries46 and turned to legislative history.47

Some treat

“Hispanic” as a question of ancestry; others stress language, culture,48

43

Compare LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions at 449, with Congressional Research
Service, COMPILATION AND OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
ESTABLISHING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS (1995) (citing 48 C.F.R. § 2426.101 (1994).
Hasidic Jews were also eligible for other SBA programs at some point. LaNoue &
Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xx, at 461.
44
The idea that humanity can be classified into biological substrata based on
phenotypic attributes has long ago been discredited. See Houston Contractors Ass’n v.
Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris County, 993 F. Supp. 545, 546 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Ian F.
Haney López, The Social Construction of Race, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
Even if a new understanding of “scientific race” should emerge from our exploration of the
human genome, the particular color lines drawn in the US are more likely to reflect our
own contingent history.
45
Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 546.
46
Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871, 927 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1999).
47
St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987) (defining race in part
based on popular understandings at the time Section 1981 was enacted).
48
Lagrua v. Ward, 519 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
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history,49 discrimination,50 or even physical appearance.51 For some courts,
defining the boundaries of “Hispanic” is like asking where blue ends and
green begins; they dismiss the category as meaningless.52
As noted, courts have reached inconsistent rulings regarding
affirmative action eligibility. If you read these opinions, there seems little
driving them besides the judges’ underlying intuitions. Judge Posner states
flatly that Iberians haven’t been victims of discrimination and challenges
the defendant to produce evidence to the contrary.53 The Eleventh Circuit
reverses the burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to prove that Iberians
don’t belong.54

Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit simply assumes the

underinclusiveness of Mexican-Americans is self-explanatory.
What is clear about these cases is that we don’t have a good way to
answer the Who Question. Indeed, the Who Question has been conspicuous
by its absence from affirmative action discourse.55 African-Americans are
increasingly losing out to newer immigrant groups with no history of de
jure discrimination.56 Yet, we continue to view affirmative action almost

49

Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.

2001).
50

Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954).
Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3rd Cir. 1991) . See also
Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1408-09 (11th Cir. 1991) (opinion of
Judge Brown).
52
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. Denver, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1069 n.17 (D. Ct.
Colo. 2000) (describing Hispanic as an inherently indeterminate category for which “there
is no agreed working definition”); Alen v. State, 596 So.2d 1083, 1084-85 (Ct. App. Fl.
1992) (questioning whether Hispanics constitute a judicially cognizable ethnic group for
jury selection purposes).
53
Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647.
54
Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1164.
55
Most debate focuses on whether racial preferences in general are morally or
constitutional defensible. More recently, commentators have questioned whether such
policies actually work as intended—Compare Richard Sanders, A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. Rev. 367 (2004) (arguing that
affirmative action harms beneficiaries by promoting them beyond their abilities), with
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, SHAPE OF THE RIVER (2004) (contrary view).
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exclusively in Black and White terms, with other groups acknowledged—if
at all—through vague euphemisms such as “people of color.”
Whether you agree or disagree with affirmative action, the fact is it
exists—we’re doing it.

So why don’t we question which groups get

included? Are we avoiding the Who Question because talking about race
makes us uncomfortable? Are we afraid of seeming politically incorrect?
Is it intellectual laziness?

Bureaucratic inertia?

Or are there deeper,

perhaps more principled reasons that underpin our current laissez faire
approach?

To answer these questions, we need to understand how

affirmative action began and how we inherited the racial categories we
have.
B.

Unholy Genesis: The Quadrangle in Historical Context

The modern era of race consciousness in government policy
emerged as an outgrowth of the civil rights movement. Beginning with
early efforts to promote equal opportunity and evolving into outright racial
quotas, the federal government increasingly began to design social policy
around race. Although the US Census had kept statistics on race for over a
century using varying categories, federal agencies suddenly had a need to
collect detailed racial data across a wide range of contexts.

Federal

statisticians therefore devised new standardized categories to record such
data. To some extent, the categories devised by federal statisticians for
such purposes tracked preexisting markers of identity—the “classic color
codes” of an earlier era of de jure racism.57 However, as US residents
became accustomed to checking off boxes classifying themselves as White,
Black, Asian, Indian, or Hispanic, a new popular consensus emerged around
this national blueprint on race.58 Moreover, the “classic color codes” soon
57

David A. Hollinger, Group Preferences, Cultural Diversity, and Social Democracy:
Notes Toward a Theory of Affirmative Action, in 55 REPRESENTATIONS 31, 33 (1996).
58
Id.
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expanded to “color in” all sorts of new immigrant groups whose racial
identities may have been ambiguous upon arrival (and occasionally
“recolored” existing groups).
Prior to this time, the boundaries of race had remained ill-defined
and were often regionally specific.59 Conceptions of race continued to
evolve as ethnic minorities such as “Jews” and “Irish,” initially stigmatized
as racial outsiders, gradually assimilated into the White “majority.”60 Thus,
as Justice Powell observes in Bakke, “[t]he concepts of ‘majority’ and
‘minority’ necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political
judgments.”61
This process of racial redefinition continues today.

The 2000

Census’ decision to recognize a new “Pacific Islander” category augurs the
birth of a distinct racial identity, and lobbying continues for an as-yet
unrecognized “Middle-Eastern-American” grouping.62

What is different

now is the stakes that attach to such categorical definitions. In the age of
identity politics, race offers a powerful mobilizing strategy to gain political
influence and extract government rents.63 Yet, despite such tangible stakes
in the “market for identities,” the construction of racial identities has been

59

Graham, supra note xx, at 40, 42. Thus, the Irish in Boston were often treated worse
than Negroes, but less ostracized elsewhere. Similar focal-points of hostility faced, e.g.
Mexicans in Texas and Chinese in California. Id.
60
See NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); St. Francis, 481 U.S.
at 610 (“Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of
the same race [in the 19th century]”).
61
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
62
YANOW, supra note xx, at 39-40.
63
The tangible benefits attached to “minority status” help to explain the reverse
trajectory which racial redefinitions now follows. In the old “melting pot” model, ethnic
immigrants (mostly European) shed their racialized “otherness” to blend into the
undifferentiated mass of hyphenated-Americans we now label “White.” Today, ethnic
groups such as Mexicans and South Asians who formerly claimed “White” identities now
consciously espouse identities of “color.” A similar attempt at redefinition is in process for
Arab-Americans. With affirmative action hinging on minority status, “Whiteness” has
become devalued in the “market for identities,” and supply has adjusted to meet demand.
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mediated through obscure bureaucratic processes operating largely outside
the public eye.64
Several recent studies have shed light on the historical genesis of our
current racial consensus.65 Three main themes emerge: First, the categories
we use were created in largely ad hoc fashion without study or debate.
Second, once established, the standardized definitions were blindly
propagated without further inquiry. Third, while the original categories
centered on groups with undeniable histories of persecution, they soon
expanded to embrace newer immigrant groups with more tenuous claims to
inclusion.
Like the Civil Rights Movement from which it sprang, affirmative
action initially focused on redress for one group, African-Americans,
reflecting the moral imperative of slavery and Segregation.66 Not only did
African-Americans present the most compelling claim to racial justice, for
all intents and purposes, they were the only racial minority of national
significance.67
Nonetheless, federal policy-makers were soon persuaded by
Hispanic and Asian leaders to bring their groups under federal protection.68
An 1956 guideline for gathering racial statistics on employment and
64

See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 140.
See LaNoue, Presumptions, supra note xx; GRAHAM, supra note xx; JOHN DAVID
SKRENTNY: MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002).
66
Lyndon Johnson famously justified affirmative action by evoking the imagery of
slavery. “You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate
him, bring up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all
the others.’” Graham, supra note xx, at 77. In this sense, affirmative action can be seen as
yet another milestone in a progression of political reforms animated by concern over
African-Americans from the Thirteenth Amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at
143-44, 173.
67
David Lauter, Minorities Adding up to a Majority, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY),
April 12, 1995 at E1. Other groups were mostly limited to a regional presence—Chinese
and Japanese-Americans on the West Coast, Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, and
Puerto-Ricans in the Northeast. GRAHAM, supra note xx at 104.
68
Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 860-61.
65
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contracting suggested “Spanish-American,” “Oriental,” “Indian,” “Jewish,”
and “Puerto-Rican” as categories.69 The 1962 “Standard Form 40” dropped
Jews and combined Puerto-Ricans with other Spanish-Americans. Widely
copied, the form constituted a quasi-official standard propagated throughout
the federal government in a variety of contexts.70
The process of determining who made it onto these lists and who got
left out was largely left to mid-level civil servants acting with little or no
policy guidance. They made almost no effort to elicit public input, or
examine empirical data, or rely on any sort of “scientific” selection
process.71 Instead, categories were chosen in essentially ad hoc fashion,
with little thought as to their long-term consequences.72
Once the lists were created, the groups included quickly assumed the
status of “official” minorities,73 an ethno-racial “quadrangle” comprised of
Blacks, Hispanics, Indians, and Asians.

The Hispanic category, in

particular, crystallized a new popular understanding of race. The MexicanAmericans of the American South-West, the Northeast’s Puerto Ricans, and
Florida’s Cubans had rarely thought of themselves, or been thought of by
others as constituting a single group until somebody decided to lump them
into single statistical category of “Spanish-Americans,”74
69

Political

SKRENTNY, supra note xx.
Graham describes how Standard Form 40 begat the EEOC’s 1965 EEO-1, which
required employers nationwide to count heads using the same four categories. The EEO-1
in turn served as the basis for the four groups singled out for preference under the 197_
Philadelphia Plan and the 1973 SBA 8(a) Program. GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 137-139.
By 1980, the Office of Management & Budget (OMB)’s Directive No. 15 had made these
standard groupings mandatory for all federal agencies gathering statistics based on race.
YANOW, supra note xxx at 37.
71
LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx.
72
GRAHAM, supra note xxx at 134, 136. The choices were also partly influenced by
instrumental constraints. For example, EEOC categories were intended to be used by
employers classifying their workforce through visual inspection. White ethnic groups, who
would be more to difficult to distinguish visually, were not included partly for this reason.
Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 862-63.
73
Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 859-867.
74
Id. at 879 n.258. The artificiality of this new grouping was underlined by the initial
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considerations also factored into these categorical choices, as with the
Nixon White House’s lobbying to include Cubans in the nascent Hispanic
category to curry favor with this loyal bloc of Republican voters.75
The stakes attached to such categorical machinations rose
dramatically following the 1960s race riots when “soft” affirmative action
focused on ensuring equal opportunity hardened into overt racial
preferences.76

With race now used explicitly to allocate government

resources, it suddenly mattered more who was included among the favored
groups. As Black Americans were the main protagonists in the riots, they
were the universal focus of efforts at redress.77 Yet, the other designated
“minorities” found themselves included in federal remedies as well since no
one wanted to undertake the contentious task of selecting between them.78
Existing category definitions thus past seamlessly into this new context, and
the definition question answered the selection question by default.
As preferential programs continued to proliferate in a diversity of
contexts, the categories of the quadrangle went with them, with no one
confusion as to what to call it: Spanish-Americans, Spanish-Speaking Americans, and
Spanish-Surnamed Americans all vied for contention (each of which, taken literally, would
embrace slightly different constituencies). Moreover, Puerto Ricans remained excluded
from early definitions of this group. Only in 1976 was the category rechristened
“Hispanic.” GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 139 n.16.
75
George LaNoue & John Sullivan, Deconstructing the Affirmative Action Categories,
41 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 913, 915 (1998). The Cuban community at that
time was composed primarily of wealthy exiles, predominantly of European extraction,
who had fled Castro’s expropriations. Id. Conversely, the omission of Jews seems to have
been prompted in large part by opposition from African-Americans. GRAHAM, supra note
xx, at 137; La Noue, Presumptions, note xx.
76
Such riots persuaded government and industry leaders that rapid hiring of AfricanAmericans was to be the price of racial peace. Racial preferences were the logical tool.
GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 137-38, 173.
77
The 1967 Kerner Commission investigating the race riots concluded that “special
encouragement” was needed to guide Blacks into the economic mainstream. No other
groups were discussed. LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx at 442.
Similarly, the Labor Department held hearings in 1969 to document discrimination against
Black workers to justify its “Philadelphia Plan” for racially preferential hiring. No record
was made of discrimination against other minority group at the hearings. GRAHAM, supra
note xx, at 139.
78
LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xx, at 440, 443.
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bothering to reinvent the definitional wheel.79 Local governments had a
built-in incentive to adhere to federal standards as they were obliged to use
federally-recognized categories on project receiving federally funds.80
However, while the standard categories have remained largely fixed
since the 1960s, the groups included within these categories have expanded
over time.

Once the category of “Spanish-Speaking Americans” was

renamed “Hispanic,” it expanded to include groups such as Brazilians who
don’t even speak Spanish.81 While Mexican- and Puerto Rican-Americans
had the main historical claims to redress, once Nixon let in Cubans, other
Latin-Americans simply rode their coattails.

Even Spaniards and

Portuguese—initially regarded as “Europeans”—successfully lobbied for
federal reclassification as “Hispanic.”82
Similarly, the “Oriental” category began with a focus on Japaneseand Chinese-Americans as the main victims of historical discrimination in
the US. Rebranded as “Asian,” the category rapidly expanded to include
other East and Southeast Asians as well as a broad swath of the South
Pacific before veering westward to envelop “Subcontinental Asians.”
This steady inflation of existing categories has been largely driven
by immigration.83 The Asian Pacific Islander (API) category, for example,
79

LaNoue & Sullivan, Deconstructing, supra note xx, at 914. Almost every federal
agency has its own form of affirmative action—from the Defense Department to the
Environmental Protection Agency—and virtually all adhere to the quadrangle. See
Congressional Research Service, COMPILATION AND OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS ESTABLISHING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS OR OTHER PREFERENCES
BASED ON RACE, GENDER, OR ETHNICITY, February 17, 1995 (providing comprehensive
list of federal affirmative action programs).
80
It makes sense to use federal categories even when administering purely local
programs to avoid duplication of standards and enable reciprocity in MBE certifications.
81
See Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1094 (Ct. App. Fl. 1992) (noting the South
American “Hispanics” can also be from Belize, and British and French Guyana—none of
which speak Spanish or Portuguese); see also GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 191 (questioning
inclusion of Belize, Surinam, Guiana as non-Spanish speaking nations).
82
49 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1999).
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GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 95. The 1965 Immigration Act paved the way for a
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now embraces almost half the world’s population. Lacking a history of
persecution in the US, the new “immigrants of color” justified their
inclusion by claiming a racial kinship that allowed them to assimilate into
existing categories.84 Acceptance of such claims has been largely “a matter
of bureaucratic convenience rather than careful ethnographic analysis.”85
Its main premise seems to have been proximity of geographic origin. In
what other sense can Samoans be said to be ethnically “like” Chinese? Or
Vietnamese “related to” Pakistanis?
Such putative commonalities tells us nothing about whether and how
these groups have experienced racial disadvantages in the US, which was
the standard that the SBA had ostensibly established for eligibility in
affirmative action. As the central arbiter of these categorical redefinitions,
the SBA made no effort to independently examine actual evidence of US
disadvantage.86 As a result, the application of its stated criteria smacked of
double standards. It turned down Persian-Americans who had demonstrated
undeniable evidence of racial prejudice on the ground that the record
presented was insufficiently “longstanding,”87 while letting in others, such
as Tongans, who made even less of a showing.88 Moreover, the SBA
designated as “disadvantaged” Asian Indians, “one of the best-educated and

massive influx of immigrants from the developing world. Two decades later, AfricanAmericans had gone from being the overwhelming majority of America’s nonwhite
population to become a minority among minorities. Id.
84
LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx at 460.
85
Id. at 459.
86
LaNoue, Presumptions, at 451, 463. The SBA seems to have paid little attention to
relevant data even when presented as part of a petition. Id. at 450 (observing that data on
business ownership and revenues included in the petition by Asian Indians did not
demonstrate disadvantage, but rather the opposite).
87
Id. at 456 (citing evidence of fervent anti-Persian sentiment in the aftermath of the
Iran Hostage Crisis).
88
A 1986 petition by Tongans admitted that—far from facing discrimination—“the
main reason for their social disadvantage was ‘[their] general lack of the English language’
because many Tongan immigrants were older and had difficulty learning English.”
LaNoue & Sullivan, supra note xxx, at 453.
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most prosperous groups in the country” and previously regarded as
Caucasian.89
Once the petition by Indians was approved, the SBA let in other
“Subcontinental Asians” without even being asked.90 Letting in Pakistanis
because they are “like” Indians raises the inevitable question: Why not
Afghanis or Persians?

Fearing such a domino effect of geographic

extrapolations, the SBA drew an arbitrary line at the Khyber Pass. On one
side of the line, Pakistani-Americans are considered racially “Asian” and
hence “disadvantaged.” On the other, Persians and Afghani-Americans are
relegated to “Whiteness” and presumptively ineligible for affirmative
action—a distinction to which almost all affirmative action programs
continue to adhere. No findings were ever made to justify this abrupt—and
etymologically perverse91—termination of “Asia Pacifica” in midContinent.92
The trial judge hearing Lebanese contractor Nadim Ritchey’s
challenge to Ohio’s MBE program found this truncated geography
preposterous.
Working our way north and west from India we first come to
Pakistan, then Iran, the Iraq, then Syria, and finally Lebanon. If
Asian Indians are “Oriental,” shall we exclude Pakistanis separated
from India only by the Great Indian Desert? And if Pakistanis are
“Oriental,” shall we exclude Iranians who share a common border
with Pakistan? And if Iran, is “Oriental,” shall we exclude Iraq
separated from Iran only by the Zagros Mountains? And if Iraq is
“Oriental,” shall we exclude Syria for the Euphrates River flows

89

Id. at 451.
LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions, supra note xxx at 452.
91
The continent of Asia originally obtained its name from the Roman province of Asia
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through both countries? And finally if Syria is “Oriental,” how can
its contiguous neighbor Lebanon be anything but Oriental.93
Accordingly,

the

court

held

Ohio’s

affirmative

action

statute

unconstitutional, declaring it “repugnant to our constitutional system of
government [to] exclude a group of United States citizens . . . [solely based
on] the side of a river, a mountain range, or a desert their ancestor decided
to settle.”94
The court’s logic is superficially appealing, but it relies on the same
logic of proximity that got the SBA into trouble. It is difficult to see where
it would end.

Regardless how you define it, race/ethnicity is not a

geographically discrete phenomenon. “The [human] species is not divided
into exclusive genetically distinct, homogenous groupings similar to
subspecies, as the concept of “race” implies. All human groups share many
features with other groups, and it is impossible to draw rigid boundaries
around them.”95
Arguably, both the Ohio court and the SBA were looking at the
problem the wrong way. Affirmative action definitions should not hinge on
global ethnography but rather should reflect the sociological meaning of
race and ethnicity as phenomena in the US, as the SBA own stated criteria
had proclaimed. If so, how are we to interpret this racial meaning, let alone
identify it in particular cases? As we have seen, the SBA and other political
actors have evaded the Who Question, propagating existing racial categories
blindly and expanding their constituencies for reasons more of bureaucratic
expediency than principle. As the next section illustrates, the Supreme
Court has proven just as unwilling to undertake the challenge.
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Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997) (cited in LaNoue, supra note XX).
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Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d. 871, 878 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1997).
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Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 551; see also Haney López, supra [Social
Construction of Race].
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C.

What the Supreme Court Hasn’t Told Us

Preferential affirmative action began in an atmosphere of racial
crisis with little unifying vision beyond the perceived need for action.96
Over time, the original focus on remedying historical injustice expanded to
embrace other objectives. Yet, while courts have said a lot about why we
can do affirmative action (which rationales count as constitutionally
compelling) and how we can do it (preferably not via quotas), they have
said very little about who gets included.
The Who Question initially appeared uncontroversial because only
one group was contemplated as the beneficiary of affirmative action:
African-Americans. As Justice Marshall argued in Bakke, “[t]he experience
of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from
that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but
also that of a whole people marked as inferior by the law.”97
However, while African-Americans remain the paradigmatic
beneficiaries, an increasing share of the affirmative action pie has gone to
other groups with less well-documented histories of societal prejudice.98
Moreover, since almost every ethnic group has suffered at least some
discrimination at some point, choosing between them is problematic.
Justice Powell saw this as an intractable challenge. The United
States, he argued in Bakke, “ha[s] become a Nation of minorities,” in which
even the so-called “ ‘majority’ is composed of various minority groups,
most of whom can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination.”99
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JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); GRAHAM,
supra note xx, at 137-38.
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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See supra note xx.
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He saw no principled basis to prioritize their competing claims to
remedial justice. “The kind of variable sociological and political analysis
necessary . . . simply does not lie within the judicial competence.”100
Justice O’Connor in Croson similarly bemoaned the impossibility of
selecting between “inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.”101
Partly because of such difficulties, the Supreme Court has rejected
societal discrimination as “too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy.”102 The inability to trace causal links between injury and
effects and to precisely calibrate a remedy raises the “danger that a racial
classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of
racial politics.”103 Fearful that societal justifications will thus be used to
legitimize demands for outright racial balancing, the Court has held that
only identified discrimination in a particularized context can serve to justify
a racial remedy.104
By reconceiving racism as discrete acts of prejudice in a limited
context, the Court avoids having to grapple with the broader societal
significance of race.105 Furthermore, Croson’s prescribed means to identify
such discrimination distances the Court even further.

Croson held that

cities could create an inference of unlawful discrimination by demonstrating
a significant disparity between the availability of qualified minority-owned

100

Id. at 297; see also De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(noting the theoretical difficulties in evaluating competing claims of minority groups).
101
Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. Without a requirement of particularized evidence, Justice
O’Connor feared that “our history will adequately support a legislative preference for
almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political strength to negotiate ‘a piece
of the action’ for its members.” Id. at 510-511.
102
Id. at 497 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); id. at 506 (for the Court).
103
Id. at 510 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). “In the absence of particularized findings, a
court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in
their ability to affect the future.” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 276
(1986).
104
Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
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firms and the share of city contracts awarded to such firms.106

The

methodology of disparity testing supplants a messy sociological inquiry
with the seemingly objective comfort of statistical analysis.107 The Court
no longer has to choose between groups because the numbers will do the
job for it.
In Bakke, Justice Powell introduced a second rationale for
affirmative action: promoting educational diversity.108 Eschewing racial
quotas, Powell insisted that consideration of race in this context be limited
to “a plus factor” weighed in a holistic assessment of each individual
applicant.109 Focusing on individual applicants again moves away from the
broader societal relevance of race.

Moreover, by deferring on first

amendment grounds to the right of universities to weigh the educational
value of the viewpoints such applicants bring, the Court remains agnostic as
to who would qualify under such a regime.110
In both cases, the Court’s solution focuses on underrepresentation.
Croson

established

an

intricate

methodology

to

calculate

such

underrepresentation in contracting. Likewise, Justice Powell makes a point
of distinguishing between Harvard’s flexible, individualized assessments
(good) from U.C. Davis’ overly rigid, numerical quotas (bad).111 Both thus
go to some lengths to establish ground rules by which to count correctly.
106

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-03, 509. Croson makes clear that disparities can only
legitimize the use of racial preferences in extreme cases, as last resort. However, lower
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107
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108
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke received the imprimatur of the full Court in
Grutter. 539 U.S. at 325.
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Bakke, 238 U.S. at 318.
110
See id. at 312-313; Richard Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 498 (1993).
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EEOC reporting requirements likewise force employers to pay attention to
racial balance, many of whom voluntarily undertake affirmative action to
increase minority representation.112 Measuring group representation—or
counting heads—has thus become our default way of answering the Who
Question. Although the context and process by which such counting occurs
vary, the numbers game is pervasive. To answer the Who Question, we
have to count.
But who are we counting? Which minority groups do we look at?
How do we define them? Croson doesn’t tell us. It answers the selection
question by reference to statistics, but ignores the definition question of
which statistics to gather. Similarly, Bakke accepts race as a proxy for
viewpoint yet leaves open how underrepresented “racial” views are to be
identified.

Bakke and Croson thus both offer frameworks to select

affirmative action beneficiaries by race while ignoring the definitional
question of what race actually is.113
Despite a vast body of case law on discrimination, there is
surprisingly little law defining “race.”

One leading case, St. Francis

College v. Al-Khazraji, defined “race” as an “identifiable class[ ] of persons
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their
ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”114 Yet, America is full of ethnic and

112

See Deborah Malamud, Affirmative Action and Ethnic Niches, in Skrenty, COLOR
LINES, supra note xx at 318 (explaining how employers have incentive to maintain racial
parity to preempt discrimination claims).
113
This ambiguity proved controversial when the SBA excluded Hasidic Jews from
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ethnicity. See LaNoue & Sullivan, supra note xxx, at 449.
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context of section 1981). See also Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d at154, 173 (3rd
Cir. 1991) (describing racial discrimination as based on stereotypes regarding identifiable
groups with shared physical or cultural traits ascribed to a common ancestry).
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national origin groups that meet this definition.115 It would be impractical to
count them all, but how do we choose between them?116
D.

Beyond Consensus: An Empirical Assessment of the
Quadrangle

For some, the answer to this unanswered question will seem
obvious. We all have an intuitive idea who the “minorities” in this country
are.

The ethno-racial quadrangle is embedded in our national

consciousness.117

Courts have explicitly defended such a “popular

consensus” approach to the Who Question, arguing that race is best
understood as “a matter of practice or attitude in the community.”118
Choosing affirmative action categories that reflect such conventions also
accords with a long line of Supreme Court cases that have defined race
according to a “popular belief” standard.119
However, to say that the categories used in affirmative action
“reflect” a popular consensus may be to get the causality reversed. As we
saw, the federal government’s establishment of formal categories for race
itself helped to manufacture the current consensus on race. Over time, the
ubiquity of such standard groupings may have reinforced this popular
consensus, as has active campaigning by identity group lobbies.120

115

The US Bureau of Census counts at least 630 established ethnic groups. Students in
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Nonetheless, the question remains whether this consensus is backed by
underlying reality.
Commentators have expressed skepticism.

George La Noue

suggests “these categories are merely bureaucratic conveniences around
which political constituencies have been constructed.”121 The comparative
scholars behind the amicus brief referenced above similarly dismiss the
quadrangle as “based on a mixture of inadequately examined folk categories
and interest group politics.”122
Empirical information is hard to come by. Most studies of race
work within the standardized categories and fail to account for intra-group
differences.

Yet, the US Census does collect some data on racial

subgroups. Such evidence reveals considerable variation within the broad
categories of the quadrangle.

Across a wide array of socio-economic

indicators, the differences within the main racial groups appear as great as
those between them.
Such internal variance is particularly striking within the Asian and
Hispanic categories. Across the board, the “top performers” score well
above the US average, while those at the bottom measure well below the
US mainstream.

For example, Asian Indian-, Chinese-, and Japanese-

Americans earn almost bachelors degrees at almost double the US average,
and their success at the graduate level is even more extreme—almost
quadruple the US average for Indian-Americans.123 Twice as many IndianAmericans occupy managerial or professional positions as the US norm,
with Chinese and Japanese also well above the norm. These groups’ homes
are valued at double the US median. By contrast, Cambodian-, Laotian-,
121

LaNoue & Sullivan, Deconstructing, supra note xxx at 917.
Amicus scholars, supra note xxx at 879.
123
See Table II for Asian census data. For a comparable analysis of Hispanic
subgroups, see infra notes xxx and Table III.
122
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Samoan-, and Tongan-Americans show statistics that present almost the
reciprocal image of their East and South Asian compatriots.124 CambodianAmericans garner half as many BAs and a quarter the number of graduate
degrees as the US average, their representation among the professional class
is also half the US rate, and their poverty rate more than double. Laotians,
Samoans and Tongans fare only slightly better.
Table II - Socioeconomic Breakdown of Asian Pacific Subgroups
Education
Occupation
Property
Income
% earning degree Managerial or Median Home
% below
Population Group Bachelors Graduate Professional
Value
Poverty Level

ALL US
ASIANS
Asian Indian
Japanese
Chinese
Koreans
Vietnamese
Samoan*
Tongan*
Laotians
Cambodian

BLACKS

15.5%
26.7%
29.6%
28.7%
24.1%
29.1%
14.5%
7.5%
7.3%
6.3%
6.9%
9.5%

8.8%

33.6%

17.3%
34.3%
13.1%
23.8%
14.6%
4.8%
3.0%
1.3%
1.4%
2.2%
4.8%

44.6%
59.9%
50.6%
52.2%
38.7%
26.9%
18.6%
13.3%
13.3%
17.8%
25.2%

*Not included in Asian totals

$119,600
$199,300
$210,200
$238,300
$232,200
$209,500
$151,400
$153,200
$149,100
$100,500
$120,800
$80,600

12.4%
12.6%
9.8%
9.7%
13.5%
14.8%
16.0%
20.2%
19.5%
18.5%
29.3%
24.9%

Source: 2000 U.S. Census

Such intra-group differences call into question the statistical
inferences of discrimination on which Croson is premised, by potentially
skewing the data used in disparity analyses. For example, consider the
variation in business formation rates among Asian-Americans (a key
variable in disparity analyses):

Koreans have the highest business

formation rate of any ethnic group, while Laotians have the lowest.125 If
you’re doing a disparity study that lumps these groups together, the
conclusions you reach based on numbers alone may not tell you much.
124

In terms of socio-economic disadvantage, Southeast Asians and Pacific Islanders
thus stand much closer to African-Americans than to the “model minority” stereotype
associated with the Asian group overall.
125
See LaNoue & Sullivan, Deconstructing, supra note xxx at 913.
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The federal district court reviewing Denver’s municipal contracting
program specifically cited disparate rates of business formation among
included groups as undermining the city’s statistical conclusions.126 The
Houston district court similarly condemned the “use of aggregate statistics
[that fail to] show the variation within the groups.”127
Disparities

due

to

immigration

further

undermine

the

methodological assumptions of Croson. Asian, Hispanic, and increasingly
even Black communities often include large numbers of recent immigrants
whose relative underrepresentation often reflects causal factors specific to
immigration—unfamiliarity with US customs, lack of social capital,
linguistic hurdles, etc.—things that have nothing to do with race and can be
expected to disappear with the passage of time. Yet, disparity studies rarely
attempt to correct for such immigration effects.128
Such internal heterogeneity raises the danger that nondisadvantaged
subgroups may ride the coattails of their less fortunate group members. The
problem is not just that a few jobs or contracts may go to a group that
doesn’t deserve them. Less-disadvantaged groups often end up usurping a
disproportionate share.129 This phenomenon also applies across minority
groups and may account for the declining share of affirmative action
benefits going to African-Americans who must now compete with more
socio-economically successful minorities
The risks cut both ways.

Not only can undeserving subgroups

piggyback on the underrepresented status of a larger group, but genuinely
disadvantaged subgroups might be unfairly excluded if the larger, umbrella
126

Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 554.
128
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d at 1164 (burden of proof on plaintiff
to rebut government’s prima facie case).
129
Malamud, supra note xx, at 321 (“when all members of minority groups are equally
eligible for affirmative action, the best-off among them will prevail”).
127
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group they belong to is too successful. One sees this in higher education,
where Asians are often overrepresented and no longer counted for diversity
purposes.

Yet, several Asian Pacific subgroups remain heavily

underrepresented.130 Samoan and Laotian students thus suffer from being
lumped together with more successful East and South Asians. These groups
look nothing alike and come from vastly different backgrounds. Yet, we
assume they share a common experience based on their “Asian” identity
that makes them fungible equivalents.131
Moreover, some arguably disadvantaged minority groups lie outside
the quadrangle entirely. A recent study of employment discrimination in
California looked at discrimination against job applicants with ethnically
identifiable names.132 The study revealed greater bias against applicants
with identifiably Arab names than those of any other ethnic group—hardly
surprising after 9-11. Yet, most affirmative action programs count ArabAmericans as White, which means they don’t get counted.
Therefore, one might question whether the wisdom of relying on
ethno-racial quadrangle as the basis for government policy. Although we
may superficially locate “race” within its coordinates, the quadrangle’s
explanatory power seems empirically questionable. In the black box of a
disparity study, garbage in means garbage out.
E.

From Empiricism to Constitutionalism: A Well-Tailored
Quadrangle?

Some might argue that such internal differences are inevitable and
beside the point. Race is not a logical construct but a projection of societal
130

Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note xx.
Cf. Metro. Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 615 (1990) (O’Connor, J.)
(criticizing assumption that there is a single “minority” viewpoint).
132
Names Make a Difference: The Screening of Resumes by Temporary Employment
Agencies in California, Report by the Discrimination Research Center (Oct. 2004), on file
with the author.
131

31

perceptions and stereotypes. Accordingly, courts have defended the popular
consensus approach (and by extension, the quadrangle) on the grounds that
it captures the sort of intangible, inter-subjective phenomena that are most
salient to affirmative action.133
Such arguments would seem to have little merit under the diversity
rationale presented by Justice Powell in Bakke. Achieving diversity within
groups would seem just as important that as between them. As a proxy for
viewpoint, the broad quadrangular categories are simply too blunt.134
Moreover, rather than conforming to existing stereotypes, the goal should
be to challenge them.

Emphasizing variation within group identities

encourages students to look beyond them.
Therefore, this section will focus on remedial affirmative action, a
context in which using categories that conform to the contours of societal
prejudice makes more sense. Arguably, the quadrangular categories “serve
well as predictors of the dynamics of mistreatment, and thus as a foundation
for initiatives designed to protect people against such mistreatment or to
compensate them for it.”135 The Tenth Circuit similarly justifies use of the
quadrangle based on “the harsh fact that racial discrimination commonly
occurs along lines of the broad categories.”136
These arguments justify the quadrangle on functional grounds, i.e.
they rest on assumptions about how racial bias functions in society.137 The
133

See, e.g. Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561 n.25.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946-47; McGowan, supra note xx, at 135 (“categorization by
race or ethnicity fails to capture the complexity of social experience of many groups . . . .
As a result, real diversity may suffer”); see also id. at 136 (use of race under guise of
diversity may be motivated by covert remedial goals).
135
Hollinger, supra note xx, at 33.
136
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d at 1176, 1185 (holding that there
was no need for further inquiries at the level of subgroups). Other courts have similarly
refused to look behind the standard quandrangular categories. See Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545;
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 324 F. Supp. 2d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2004),
Dynalantic Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 937 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Dist. 1996).
137
Such a functional approach was demonstrated by the Supreme Court in. Hernandez
134
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idea is that if Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans all encounter a
particular kind of racial prejudice (whereas, e.g., Chinese do not), one can
say that the former are discriminated against “as Hispanics.”138

The

category “Hispanic” is defined by the contours of anti-Hispanic bias.
On one level, this is just the basic law of remedies: defining the
remedial class based on the scope of the injury. “To define an Indian or a
Black to determine who should be counted . . . [you] look at the actual
discrimination being rectified and treat as Blacks or Indians the same kind
of people that the defendants had treated as Blacks or Indians.”139 The
problem with voluntary affirmative action, however, is there is no identified
tortfeasor to base such decisions on, nor likely any direct evidence of
discrimination. In a typical Croson disparity study, the “discrimination” is
inferred through statistical analysis. Its scope can be measured only in
terms of statistical aggregates. Moreover, the procedural order is inverted:
Instead of the injury determining the remedial categories, here, racial
categories must be established in order to demonstrate the existence of the
injury through statistical disparities measured with respect to such
categories. Therefore, unlike a typical tort remedy, the definition question
must be answered prior to the “selection question.” Different definitions
will encompass different data sets, but there may be several variant
definitions which could each give rise to a valid finding of statistical

v. Texax where the Court contrasted the popular view of Mexican-Americans as racially
White, with the systematic prejudice that marked them as something “other,” the functional
equivalent of a separate race. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). In this case, Hollinger and 10th Circuit
seek to assimilate such a functional view of race into the popular one.
138
Cf. Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1176 n.18 (Asian-Americans discriminated against
because they were Asian-Americans); Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 (defining race as an
identifiable group subjected to discrimination based on shared traits).
139
See Montana Contractors' Ass’n. v. Sec’y of Commerce, 460 F. Supp. 1174, 1176
(D. Mont. 1978) (“In those cases the discriminating actor defines the race as to which relief
should be granted by his act of discrimination, and when the remedy is fashioned, it
necessarily is tailored to correct the actual injustice done.”); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ.,
941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991).
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underrepresentation. Such definitional choices matter because they define
the scope of prima facie “discrimination” and hence the presumptive
contours of any remedy.
Rocco Luiere’s case illustrates this problem in that the composition
of the Hispanic data set was actually litigated.140 Since Iberians make up
only 2% of the Hispanic population of New York State, the state’s finding
that Hispanics were underrepresented in public contracting would likely
have been made regardless of whether Iberians were counted in its disparity
study.

Yet, because the category used to count with dictates the

presumptive contours around which the remedy will be fashioned, the
choice of definition going in determined whether Iberians had a prima facie
claim to share in the remedy.141 Rather than the “injury” defining the
remedy, in practice, New York’s choice of definition defines the “injury.”
The definition question thus predetermines New York’s answer to the
“selection question.”
Definitional fiats also dictated the outcome of Lebanese contractor
Nadim Ritchey’s case in Ohio.

In rejecting his challenge to Ohio’s

“Oriental” category, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “persons of
Lebanese ancestry have [not been shown to have] suffered disadvantage and
discrimination in the area of state contracting opportunities to the same
degree and to the same extent [as] the minority groups listed in [Ohio’s
statute].”142 In reality, the only discrimination shown against “Orientals”
was inferred from statistical disparities affecting all “minorities” (i.e. those
Ohio’s legislature chose to recognize as such).143 Moreover, Ohio defined
140

See Jana-Rock, Memorandum-Decision.
The choice of category thus controls both inputs and outputs. See Ritchey, 707
N.E.2d 871 (arguing to do otherwise would run the risk of overinclusiveness, by including
beneficiaries not shown to have suffered the injury).
142
Ritchey, 707 N.E.2d at 922.
143
See id. at 736-37 (criticizing the statistical evidence on which the Ohio legislature
had relied on for lumping all minority groups together in undifferentiated analysis).
141
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its remedial class to include subgroups who may not even have existed
among Ohio contractors at the time the findings of disparities were
compiled.144 Had Lebanese been thrown into this mix, presumably they too
would now be cloaked in the same presumptive entitlement.
To bestow on the groups who were included a collective blessing
denied to Lebanese assumes that Ohio had a logical basis for testing only
the former—an assumption which the Ohio Supreme Court leaves
unexamined.

Conversely, the Tenth Circuit upheld the inclusion of

Bhutanese and Samoans in federal set-asides because it assumed that “as
Asians” they were subject to the discrimination against “Asians” that
Congress had statistically identified, without questioning the underlying
definition of “Asian-ness” being relied on.145
The problem with these cases is that they ignore the crucial
advantages conferred by inclusion among the “official” minorities of the
quadrangle. Once relegated to the status of outsiders, Rocco Luiere and
Nadim Ritchey faced uphill battles, saddled with the burden of proof to
overcome their definitional exclusion.146

By contrast, groups such as

Bhutanese-Americans benefit from their status as definitional insiders on
several levels. First, such tiny subgroups are likely too small to generate
statistically significant evidence of disparities and may not have even been
present at the relevant time. Being included in the quadrangle overcomes
such logistical obstacles and enables these newer subgroups to piggyback
144

Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik , 214 F.3d 730, 737 (noting
pointedly that “contractors of, let us say, Thai origin . . . might never have been seen in
Ohio until recently,” yet would receive a preference). Others appear to have been
retroactively written into the category definitions.
145
Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1176 & n.18.
146
Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d at 922; Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at
*41; see also Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561. All these cases effectively put the burden of proof
on the plaintiff to challenge the category. Narrow tailoring, however, normally places the
burden on the government to defend its classifications. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 505 (2005).
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on a documented history of bias against their ostensible ethnic kin. Second,
the fact that Asian, Hispanic, and increasingly even Black communities
typically include large numbers of recent immigrants confers a built-in
advantage in disparity analyses, given the likelihood that recent immigrants
will be inherently underrepresented.
As a result, who gets counted where matters more than one might
initially think.

In many cases, the answer to the selection question is

predetermined by the “definition question.” Yet, as we have seen, the
definitions we have emerged in a fairly arbitrary process.

Categories

concocted without much thought were politically manipulated and
expanded through dubious exercises in armchair ethnography, then blindly
replicated and defended by entrenched interest groups. Moreover, such
boundary lines continue to be manipulated. South Asians, for example,
were retroactively added to Ohio’s “Oriental” category by an executive
order of the governor, which critics linked to campaign contributions from
Indian donors.

Portuguese joined California’s Hispanic category under

similar circumstances.147
Such political manipulations underscore the Houston court’s dictum
that “race is politics.”

It is one thing to argue that race is inherently

subjective and that arbitrary divisions are inevitable.

However, if the

process by which definitional lines were drawn is itself suspect, it becomes
more difficult to justify according them a presumptive validity. From the
standpoint of a Rocco Luiere or Nadim Ritchey, the playing field hardly
seems level.148 Furthermore, to the extent such arbitrary definitions result
147

Inspector General of Ohio, Report of Investigation, Case No. 93-39 available at
http://watchdog.ohio.gov/investigations%5Coiggov.htm#pri.
148
One could argue that the “consensus” around the quadrangle merely obscures an
original injustice. This begs the question as to an appropriate remedy. If the popular
consensus is now a fait-accompli, is it too late to go back? Trademark law offers some
precedent for forced efforts to reverse popular attitudes. Cf. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Inc., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977). Admittedly, the weight
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in the inclusion of otherwise undeserving subgroups (or omission of others
that are deserving), this raises the danger of over- or underinclusiveness in
the remedy. This turns an empirical debate into a constitutional question:
Must affirmative action definitions be narrowly tailored to serve the goals
of affirmative action in order for the remedy to comply with strict scrutiny?
Enforcing such narrow tailoring of categories would help to align
the definition question with the selection question in that the same
normative concerns would apply to both. When it comes to analyzing such
“category tailoring” issues, however, courts have been all over the page.
Most simply ignore the issue.

Others have invoked obstacles. of

standing,149 manipulated burdens of proof,150 limited their assessment to the
facts “as applied,”151 or demanded evidence of bad intent.152 Courts have
also struggled to locate this kind of equal protection challenge within
existing doctrine. Such definitional questions could be cognized in two
different ways: either (1) as a facial challenge to the definition qua racial
classification or (2) as a narrow tailoring challenge to the remedy that
follows from it.153 Courts have followed both approaches, sometimes in the
same opinion.154 They have also differed as to the level of scrutiny they
apply.155
of momentum to be overcome in this context is far greater.
149
Peightal, 940 F.2d at 1409 n.39 (questioning plaintiff’s standing as white male to
object to Hispanic definition).
150
Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545; Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio Sup. Ct.).
151
Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545; Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of
Econ. Dev., 5:04-CV-635, Memorandum-Decision and Order, Oct. 28, 2004 (N.D.N.Y.).
152
Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050.
153
Compare Jana-Rock Memorandum-Decision (facial classification approach), with
Peightal, 26 F.3d 1545 (narrow tailoring analysis).
154
Cf. Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050.
155
Compare Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050; Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647,
with Ritchey trial court. In Rocco Luiere’s case, the district court fundamentally
misconceived the doctrinal requirements in this regard. Cf. Jana-Rock MemorandumDecision (opting for rational basis on dubious ground that “a person of Spanish descent
does not qualify as a member of a suspect class either on the basis of race or national
origin”).
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Many courts simply assume that disparity testing itself “validates”
the choice of racial categories by identifying discrimination against the
population they encompass,156 reducing definitional uncertainties to a
statutory interpretation issue, “more a question of nomenclature than of
narrow tailoring.”157

Yet, it seems circular to argue that findings of

statistical disparities validate the choice of initial categories because, as we
have seen, such definitions can be manipulated without altering the
statistical conclusion.

Since the discrimination is merely inferred

statistically, its accuracy depends partly on the assumptions that shape its
inputs.
Therefore, even if Hollinger and the 10th Circuit are correct to
suggest that patterns of prejudice broadly track the popular consensus on
race, this still does not mean that each and every included subgroup in these
broad racial categories experiences “race” the same way.

Given the

haphazard way in which such categories were created, the risk of outliers
cannot be dismissed. If the quadrangle only imperfectly tracks the criteria
relevant to the purposes of affirmative action, such an imperfect “fit” would
still raise narrow tailoring issues.158 Blind deference to existing definitions
therefore seems unfounded. Since the choice of categories helps determine
who is preferred (and who is excluded) on the basis of race, courts should
arguably require some justification for drawing such lines that goes beyond
the reflexive rubberstamping of federal definitions.159

156

Cf. Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d at 893-95 (arguing that disparity testing defines
the limits of narrow tailoring).
157
Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1185. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court determines category
boundaries according to their dictionary meaning. See Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E.2d at 927
(construing “the common, ordinary, and everyday meaning of the term ‘Oriental’”).
158
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“deviations from equality require utmost precision”)
159
See Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at *31-32 (arguing New York needed to
tailor its categories to its own context).
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This Article has suggested a “categorical tailoring” approach that
would align the definition question with the “selection” question leaving
both to be answered in a manner narrow tailored to serve the normative
goals of affirmative action. Such an approach would draw inspiration from
Croson itself.

Although the bulk of the Croson decision ignores the

“definition question,” it did offer some cryptic hints regarding “categorical
tailoring” requirements.
In Croson, the Court was primarily concerned with the evidentiary
showing of particularized discrimination needed to legitimate racial
preferences. The Court rejected Richmond’s evidence of discrimination
against minority-owned businesses in the local construction industry as
falling short of the statistical standards the Court required.160 However,
what make Croson unique from the standpoint of the Who Question is that
the opinion went beyond this generalized majority-minority paradigm to
distinguish between minority groups.

Writing for the Court, Justice

O’Connor noted that the Richmond had made a colorable case for inclusion
of only one group, African-Americans.

By contrast, no evidence

whatsoever had been offered to show discrimination in the local
construction industry against any of the other minority groups that
Richmond had made eligible for preferences, including “Spanish-speaking,
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons.”161

Justice O'Connor

commented archly that “[i]t may well be that Richmond has never had an
Aleut or Eskimo citizen.” She observed that the “random inclusion of
[such] groups” belied Richmond’s remedial intent.162
This brief venture by the Court into the uncharted terrain of the Who
Question reads like an aside, occupying two paragraphs in a otherwise
160

Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-502.
See id. at 506.
162
Id.
161
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lengthy opinion. So it may be unwise to overread its significance. Perhaps
Justice O’Connor only meant to stress the absurdity of including such
“random” groups as Aleuts.

However, O’Connor also questioned the

inclusion of other minority groups who were represented in Richmond’s
construction industry (albeit in small numbers). Moreover, much of the
evidence Richmond had offered—including its statistical analysis—
pertained to minority contractors as a whole without differentiating by race.
Nonetheless, Croson drew a clear distinction between the undeniable (albeit
inadequate) evidence of bias against Blacks and the complete lack of
evidence of bias against any other group. By parsing this evidence to
distinguish Blacks from other minorities, Croson seemed to suggest that
Richmond needed to have done its disparity testing on a more targeted
basis.
What to make of this? Croson’s disparity testing methodology was
modeled on the Court’s Title VII case law in which lumping minorities
together for statistical purposes had not hitherto been seen as
objectionable.163 What may have been different here was specific evidence
of historical discrimination in the record pertaining exclusively to AfricanAmericans (who also constituted the overwhelming majority of minorities
in Richmond). Therefore, the Court may have seen Blacks as a special case
in that context, demanding individualized analysis.164
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See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 568 (1979) (Hispanic and
Black employees counted together in assessment of disparate impact of methadone ban);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 642 (1989) (all “minorities” pooled in
statistical disparity assessment); Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States 433 U.S. 299, 307-308 (1977)).
164
Similarly, in Montana Contractors, the court rejected the inclusion of other
minority groups when the evidence in the record really focused on Native Americans. 460
F. Supp. 1174 (D. Mont. 1978).
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In practice, the almost universal approach has been to assess
underrepresentation based on the standard quadrangular categories.165 Yet,
given the diversity of contexts in which affirmative action operates, the
ubiquity of the quadrangle arguably bespeaks a “one-size-fits-all” approach
that runs contrary to the dictates of narrow tailoring. Several courts have
taken a dim view of affirmative action plans that adopt such a “laundry list”
approach to category-making, drawing analogies to Croson’s “random
inclusion” of Aleuts.166
Croson strongly implies that the mere fact that Richmond defined a
data set that may have “included” Aleuts in a definitional sense would not
justify their inclusion in the ensuing remedy if there were no Aleuts actually
present.167 Croson also makes it clear that the subsequent arrival of an
Aleut contingent would do nothing to alter this analysis, since AfricanAmerican contractors who “actually suffered” discrimination should not be
obliged to share their remedy with such Johnny-come-latelies.168
Following Croson’s lead, lower courts have duly incorporated a
“random inclusiveness” prong as part of their narrow tailoring review.
Thus, a Sixth Circuit panel found Ohio’s definition of “Oriental”
165

See George LaNoue, To the 'Disadvantaged' Go the Spoils?, PUBLIC INTEREST
Winter 2000, at 91. Where statistical evidence of disparities for particular groups has
proven lacking, courts have held such groups ineligible. See, e.g. Contractors Assoc. of E.
Penn., Inc. v. Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d. Cir. 1993) (non-black minority groups enjoined
from inclusion within municipal affirmative action program).
166
Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.
2001). See also Houston Contractors Ass’n v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris County, 993
F. Supp. 545, 555 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (criticizing Texas for “cop[ying] whatever the federal
government required to get federal funds without a determination of the categories or the
applicability to Texas’s experience.”); Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702
(9th Cir. 1997) (speculating that “those who drafted the statute for the legislature copied
from a model form and neglected to strike its inapplicable portions”).
167
To do this, Richmond would not have to count any actual Aleuts in compiling its
minority data. All it would do was define a data set of “all minorities” that theoretically
embraced any Aleuts who might have happened to be there. Assuming disparities were
established for that data set, the same “all minority” category would then constitute the
remedial class which, by definition, included Aleuts.
168
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506, 508 (1989).
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overinclusive, in part, because it included groups “who might never have
been seen in Ohio until recently” such as Thai-Americans.169 Drawing an
analogy to Richmond’s Aleuts, the court argued that including Thais in a
beneficiary category would violate narrow tailoring.170 San Francisco chose
to omit Dominicans from its Hispanic definition on similar grounds.171
The problem with this sort of categorical tailoring analysis is that it
has no logical stopping point: If narrow tailoring requires attention to
subgroups, how small does one have to go?172 Almost any group definition
will include an identifiable subset of people who were/are not actually
present at some relevant time.173 Pushed to the limit, categorical tailoring
of this form would require individualized analysis to a degree that would
preclude group remedies based on race.174
To avoid such difficulties, we should return to the Tenth Circuit’s
functional test which defines the “relevant group” according to the context
169

In Croson, Aleuts had been explicitly identified as a racial category on their own,
whereas Thais were merely a subgroup within Ohio’s Oriental category. It is unclear,
however, why this fact should be dispositive. Would the Court have less perturbed had
Richmond defined a category of “Native Americans” that included Aleuts? In fact,
Richmond did have a separate category of “Indians,” although presumably not every single
federally recognized tribe was represented among Richmond’s population of contractors.
170
See id. at 737; see also Monterrey Mechanical, 125 F.3d at 714 (same problem with
Aleuts in California).
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Interview with Mara Rosales, Office of City Attorney, San Francisco, February 2,
1998 (explaining that the Dominicans had not been represented in the relevant population
of contactors).
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The Sixth Circuit distinguished Thai from Chinese. But there are many different
ethnic/linguistic subgroups among Chinese. Does it matter whether the Chinese were
Cantonese vs. Hakka? Race and ethnicity can be disaggregated endlessly down to
individual villages and extended families. But at some point, such distinctions no longer
seem relevant from the standpoint of US policy.
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“Presence” also is a murky concept—if a single Aleut had wandered through
Richmond fifty years ago and suffered discrimination, would this suffice? If not, how
many and how recent? Would they have to have been actual contractors who were “ready
and able” to bid? or just potential contractors?
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In theory, such individualized analysis is already required under the constitutional
standards governing consideration of race in university admissions, although the use of
broad racial categories to assess diversity undercuts this claim to individuation. Croson
also gestures toward individualized appraisals by requiring “opt out” provisions and
procedures to challenge individual eligibility. Croson, 488 U.S. at 508.
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in which such group identities function. If Ohio bigots are functionally
incapable of distinguishing between Thais and other Asians subgroups, then
Ohio can justify defining race broadly. Arguably, it should not matter that
the only victims of historical discrimination happened to have been
Chinese.

So long as “Asian-American individuals [were] subject to

discrimination because of their status as Asian-Americans” there is no need
to distinguish between them by subgroup, since in functional terms Thais
constitute the racial equivalent of Chinese.175
Adopting such an external perspective on race pushes us back
toward a “popular consensus” view.176 We can assume that beyond national
origin, finer distinctions regarding group identity are likely irrelevant. Yet,
a popular view of race is not necessarily synonymous with a functional
reading. One sees a divergence between popular vs. functional conceptions
of race, for example, with Black immigrant groups in New York. Although
most people would unquestionably identify Nigerians and Jamaicans as
racially “Black,” these groups don’t seem to attract the same degree of
racial prejudice as African-Americans.177

At least in the job market,

employers have either learned to look beyond color and differentiate by

175

Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1176 n.18 (emphasis added). Arguably, equating Thais with
Chinese here is no different than counting both Fujienese and Hunanese as Chinese when
only the former had a historical presence.
176
The results of an external approach to “functional race” will not always be
coterminous with the popular consensus. Ohio bigots might learn to distinguish Thais from
Chinese and discriminate more discriminately even though continuing to regard both
groups as “Asian.” Similarly, one might conclude that Chinese and Thai students bring
different sorts of diversity to the classroom, even if their fellow students initially fail to
distinguish between them.
177
See Lee, supra note xx, at 184. The likely explanations are complex and cultural:
West Indian and African immigrants appear less burdened by pernicious stereotypes than
domestic Blacks. They never experienced the psychic wounds inflicted by slavery and Jim
Crow. They also tend to have stronger family support structures and more positive role
models.
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subgroup, or are otherwise responsive to cultural nuances that permit such
immigrants to evade the full brunt of racial prejudice.178
Therefore, the quadrangle is still subject to scrutiny on a functional
basis, as the Seventh Circuit demonstrated:

That court rejected Cook

County’s Hispanic category because it included Spanish and PortugueseAmericans, “groups . . . that common sense (not contradicted by any
evidence) instructs have never been subject to significant discrimination by
Cook County.”179 Even though Iberians arguably fell within the popular
meaning of “Hispanic,” they failed Judge Posner’s functional test of racial
meaning because they were not subject to the kind of anti-Hispanic
prejudice that the remedy was intended to target. Because the remedial
category did not “fit” the purpose of the remedy, it violated narrow
tailoring.180

This sort of “categorical tailoring” analysis has also been

applied to underinclusive categories, i.e. those which omit subgroups
similar to the ones included.181
Croson also strongly emphasized the importance of the local
evidentiary context.

In holding that only “particularized findings” of

discrimination could justify race-conscious remedies, the Court rejected
Congressional findings of discrimination in construction contracting
178

The stereotype of Jamaicans as having a strong work ethic—as portrayed in such
mainstream television shows as “In Living Color” (where the Jamaican characters were all
portrayed as working multiple jobs)—may have convinced some that Jamaicans were the
“good” kind of Black. Others may simply like their exotic accents.
179
Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647.
180
Note that it did not matter whether Chicago could demonstrate a statistical disparity
based on a Hispanic data set that happened to include Iberians. Posner found the category
itself so inherently implausible that by defining “Hispanic” in this over-inclusive manner,
the category was void ab initio. Just as Croson objected to Richmond’s lumping Blacks
together with other minority groups not subject to the same discriminatory history, the
racial experience of Iberians was deemed too “unlike” other Hispanics to treat them the
same.
181
Ohio’s inclusion of South Asians, but not Lebanese in its “Oriental” category was
deemed underinclusive for this reason. Ritchey Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590 at
*6. See also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 n.37 (questioning of preferences to MexicanAmericans, but not other Hispanics under a diversity rationale).
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nationwide as insufficient to support preferences in the municipal
context.182 Instead, to survive strict scrutiny, Richmond had to identify
discrimination locally in the specific sector for which it proposed a remedy.
Similarly, the Court’s objection to Richmond’s lumping Blacks with other
“minorities” seemed to turn on the specific local history of anti-Black bias.
Accordingly, one might infer that categorical tailoring should be informed
by attention to the local context as well.
The Second Circuit followed this rationale when it argued that New
York State needed to “mak[e] an independent assessment of discrimination
against Hispanics of Spanish origin in New York.”183 Other courts have
echoed this view.184 As one court observed, “the needs of the Japanese in
Hawaii are [not] the same as those of the Japanese in California . . . the
needs of [American] Indians in New York are [not] the same as those of the
Indians in Montana.”185 Texas’ restriction of affirmative action to groups
most subject to historical discrimination in Texas similarly met the Fifth
Circuit’s approval as evidence of narrow tailoring.186
Some courts despair at the complexities such categorical tailoring
demands implicate. Perhaps the most forthright such response was that of
the Second Circuit in Rocco Luiere’s case, where the court noted that:
the fact that a particular governmental decision to use
classifications based on race or national origin in a particular
context passes strict scrutiny does not relieve those
182

See 488 U.S. at 504.
Id. at *31-32 (emphasis added).
184
See Houston Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 555 (criticizing Texas for employing
generic affirmative action categories that fail to take into account Texas’s specific racial
history and social context).
185
Montana Contractors, 460 F. Supp. at 1178; see also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.,
NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES 175 (1996)
(distinguishing the social position of Aleuts in Anchorage from that in Richmond). In fact,
Hawaii does not include Japanese in affirmative action, having devised more focused
categories tailored to its diverse Asian populace.
186
See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
183
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categories of their possible arbitrariness and unreliability . . .
Indeed, we find it difficult to imagine what a “correct” racial
classification would be. It will always exclude persons who
have individually suffered past discrimination and include
those who have not.187
The Second Circuit “solved” the problem by denying that narrow tailoring
applied.188
Other courts have veered to the opposite extreme, unable to accept
the idea that “[b]y its very nature, [a race-conscious] program is both
underinclusive and overinclusive.”189 These courts regard the problem as
effectively fatal.190
Yet, arguably, neither extreme deference nor presumptive invalidity
is appropriate. Race is messy, and there are no perfect answers. But this
does not mean we should give up trying. Narrow tailoring has never been
held to require a perfect fit. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
insisted that when it comes to affirmative action, strict scrutiny must not be
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”191 Therefore, this means finding “a
permissible middle ground . . . between the entirely individualized inquiry
of a Title VII lawsuit, for example, and an unconstitutionally sweeping,
race-based generalization.”192
How then should such a “permissible middle ground” be defined?
Equally importantly, on what basis can we assess categorical validity to
187

2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at *33-34. See also Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1561 n.25
(decrying the “troubling” and “vexatious” nature of group definitions because of the sheer
“irrationality” of race).
188
Id. Oddly, the Second Circuit accepted categorical tailoring applied to
overinclusiveness. Its holding only rejected tailoring claims based on underinclusiveness.
189
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D.Colo. 1997).
190
Id. (finding “it difficult to imagine a race-based classification that is narrowly
tailored)”; see also Ritchey Produce, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590, *6 (same); Houston
Contractors, 993 F. Supp. at 557 (“[r]ace has never been either narrow or accurate”).
191
Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
192
Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1186 (rejecting the district court’s tailoring analysis because
‘[r]equiring that degree of fit would render strict scrutiny “fatal in fact”’).
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make such determinations? The arbitrary basis on which the quadrangle
was created, as well as its internal heterogeneity, and lack of responsiveness
to local context counsel against blind deference to the status quo. But
before we reject the quadrangle as an inadequate “map” to locate racial
disadvantage,193 we need a way to construct better categories to count with.
F.

An Epistemology of Race and The Limits of Judicial
Scrutiny

As we have seen, courts on both sides of the definitional debate have
endorsed a functional test to map racial meaning based on commonalities of
experience.194

Crudely put, this asks whether we can expect bigots to

discriminate equally against Japanese and Pakistanis before we lump into
the same category.195 Operationalizing such a standard, however, presents a
formidable challenge.

It can be divided into three parts:

The first is

normative: We need to identify the function of race in affirmative action.196
The second challenge is methodological: Assuming we know what we are
looking for, how do we measure it and map out its boundaries? Third, we
must address the question of context—where should we gather the relevant
data? nationally? regionally? within a single industry? or across society?
Discussion of normative issues will be deferred until Part II-D. For
now, let us continue to use discrimination as our reference point, without
defining it further. The questions then become how and where do we look
193

Amicus scholars, supra note xxx, at 879.
This might be caricatured as “Hispanic is as Hispanic does” (or is done to). In
particular, we need to understand how race functions in terms of salient social phenomena
targeted by affirmative action.
195
In diversity terms, the question might be whether Samoans and Sri Lankans bring a
set of shared perspectives to the classroom. And we also need to establish that such
commonalities set these groups apart from others.
196
This can be understood in different ways—from the effects of racial stereotypes to
the value of diversity in education. The relevant criteria will thus vary depending on the
rationale behind a particular program. Are we looking for intentional acts of hostile
bigotry? Lingering patterns of disadvantage? Structural barriers? Diverse perspectives in
a classroom? Civic representation in elite institutions? See infra notes xx.
194

47

for it? To begin with, we need an empirical basis to detect discrimination.
In Croson, we already possess one such a tool. It uses disparities as a proxy
for discrimination. Croson uses such disparities to answer the selection
question (i.e. who qualifies for a remedy), but, in theory, we could answer
the definition question this way as well. Examining the underrepresentation
of racial subgroups could help us design better categories to count with and
thus ensure more narrowly tailored remedies.

For example, to decide

whether to include Iberians in our definition of “Hispanic,” we could count
Iberians separately. If our findings for the subgroup diverge significantly
from the group as a whole, we would adjust our definition of “Hispanic”
thereafter to exclude them.197
The problem with this approach is that Croson restricts the context
in which such counting occurs. Data on subgroups might be inadequate to
assess disparities in highly particularized contexts.198 For example, there
are likely not enough Iberian highway contractors in New York City to
generate statistical findings with any confidence.

Croson’s focus on a

narrow context thus requires us to work with broader group categories,
which, as we have seen, risks over- or under-inclusiveness.
To avoid such narrow tailoring concerns, we need another way to
look at subgroups and refine our category definitions.

Particularized

underrepresentation is not the only way to locate discrimination. To narrow
the focus to subgroups, we must broaden the context. Instead of examining
Hispanic contractors in one industry, we could undertake a broader
assessment of societal prejudice against various plausibly “Hispanic”

197

If this approach worked, we could also eliminate a step by making
underrepresentation of subgroups the sole determinant: i.e. counting not just Iberians, but
also Brazilians, Argentineans, every other national origin subgroup separately.
198
This problem already affects groups such as Native Americans whose numbers are
often too small too generate statistically meaningful evidence. As a result, Native
Americans have been omitted from many municipal contracting programs.
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subgroups to see which ones seem most likely to be victimized by racial
bias.199
Shifting to a societal focus to answer the definition question makes
sense, since the goal is not to identify discrimination with the specificity
necessary to justify a remedy, but rather to assess the pathways such
discrimination is likely to follow as an initial step.

This preliminary

definitional analysis would allow us to refine our categories definitions
which would then be used in the ensuing “selection phase” to detect
particularized discrimination with increased confidence.
Courts that have engaged in “categorical tailoring” do appear to rely
implicitly on such societal assessments.

In disagreeing as to whether

Iberian-Americans should be counted as "Hispanic,” the Second, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuit all framed the issue as whether Iberians faced
discrimination in a broader sense than the particularized context at issue.
That said, how do we resolve the issue? Whether or not Iberians face
societal discrimination is an empirical question.200 Yet, in none of these
cases was any attempt made to answer through evidence. Instead, such
courts justified their underlying intuitions by manipulating the burden of
proof201 or relying on generalized ipse dixit as to the “nature of
discrimination.”202
This brings us back to the challenge that Justice Powell saw as
intractable. Since almost every ethnic group has experienced discrimination
199

This shift to a societal focus could still be confined to a localized context such as
New York City. An alternative approach would be to look at data on Iberian highway
contractors nationwide and interpolate those findings to the local context, as Richmond
tried to do in Croson in relying on findings by Congress. But see Jana-Rock, 2006 C. App.
Lexis 4050, (rejecting Croson to preclude that approach).
200
The answer is unlikely to be all or nothing. One might express the perceived
“Hispanic-ness” of Iberians in percentage terms of how often they are identified as Latino
relative to other Hispanic subgroups. Perhaps over fifty percent would be the cutoff.
201
Ritchey, 707 N.E.2d at 927; Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 647.
202
Builders Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 642.
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to some degree, he saw no principled basis to choose between them.
Unable to evaluate such “amorphous” claims judicially and unwilling to
defer to political bodies lest “racial classification[s become] merely the
product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics,”203 the Court
has rejected societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative action.
Instead, the Court redirects the analysis to particularized contexts,
focusing on underrepresentation in local contracting or diverse viewpoints
of individual candidates. It seeks comfort in statistics to sort through the
complexities of race. Yet, by telling us how to count, but not whom, the
Supreme Court answers only half the Who Question.
Such omission cannot be merely accidental. After four decades of
affirmative action litigation, if the Court had wanted to probe the logic of
racial categories, it surely could have found a way to do so.204

The

comments of individual justices writing outside the majority betray a
noticeable disquietude at the unanswered questions the Who Question
raises.

Several members of the Court have pressed the issue of over-

/underinclusiveness writing outside the majority, arguing that singling out
certain minority groups but not others for preferred treatment may violate
equal protection.205 Justice Kennedy also questioned the politics underlying
203

Croson, 488 U.S. at 497, 506, 510.
The Supreme Court selects the cases it wants to review through grant of certiorari
and can direct parties to brief additional issues it deems relevant. Cf. Pildes & Niemi,
supra note xx, at 498 (noting in a different equal protection context that “[t]he Court could
have asked the parties to address or reargue” a racial issue and ascribing the Court’s failure
to do so to “the caution and tentativeness that characterizes the current Court’s approach to
race.”)
205
For example, Justice Douglas questioned the preference shown to Filipinos, but not
Japanese by the University of Washington. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Powell suggested that the list of groups
targeted by University of California was both underinclusive Bakke, 438 U.S at 309 n.45.
(“The University is unable to explain its selection of only the four favored groups.") and
overinclusive, id. at 310 ("The inclusion of [Asians] is especially curious in light of the
substantial numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions process). See also
Metro. Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J. dissenting)
(criticizing enumeration of preferred racial groups as underinclusive); Fullilove, 448 U.S.
204
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specific category definitions.206 Yet, with the exception of Croson’s brief
aside, the Court’s majority and plurality opinions have stuck doggedly
within the confines of a majority/minority framework.207
Viewed in this light, the Court’s failure to address the
constitutionality of racial category-making can be seen as part of a larger
pattern running through much of the Court's recent cases, namely the
profound discomfort which the Court exhibits in coming to terms with race.
In contrast with the racial jurisprudence of the nineteenth century where
courts freely indulged in the racial classification game,208 the modern Court
shuns such inquiries, because it recognizes that there are no easy answers.
Racial classifications, the Court has belatedly acknowledged, reflect social
conventions more than biological truth.209

Rather than stray into such

subjective and sensitive terrain, the Court prefers to rhetorically distance
itself from the social reality of race, referring to it instead in terms of its
most superficial attribute—skin color.210
Indeed, the very model of strict scrutiny that defines the modern
Court's equal protection jurisprudence posits race as an irrelevant, even
distasteful phenomena to be tolerated only under extreme circumstances.211

at 537-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that selection of preferred classes failed a
rational basis test); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267, 284 n.13 (opinion of Powell, J.).
206
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (relating attempt to exclude
Cubans from Hispanic group “on the grounds that [they] are republicans”).
207
See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486 (“[t]here has been no showing in this case that
Congress has . . . exclud[ed] from coverage an identifiable minority group that has been the
victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered
by the groups encompassed.”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n.35 (1978) (Opinion of Marshall,
Brennan, Blackmun, and White) ( “We are not asked to determine whether groups other
than those favored . . . should similarly be favored. All we asked to do is to pronounce the
constitutionality of [the affirmative action]”).
208
HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW, supra note xx.
209
St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987).
210
See Gotanda, supra note xx, at 3, 40. An extreme example of such rhetorical
distancing is Justice Thomas’ dissent in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 n.3 (likening racial
preferences to an “aesthetic” of skin color).
211
Instead of engaging in the “variable sociological and political analysis” required to

51

The problem with a doctrinal structure premised on dismissing race as an
irrelevancy is that affirmative action is one area where, by hypothesis, race
does matter.212 So long as one accepts that racially-explicit group remedies
may, in some circumstances, pass constitutional muster, recognition of the
salience of group identities becomes unavoidable.
Focusing on particularized contexts does not so much answer this
larger societal question as deflect it. Relying on numbers to answer the
Who Question abstracts the question of group selection from the issue of
group definition.

In doing so, the Court avoids an inquiry into the

underlying societal significance of race at the cost of continued definitional
ambiguity. Moreover, permitting policy-makers to rely on the quadrangle
by default means counting with categories that are themselves suspect, the
product of the same “unthinking stereotypes or . . . racial politics” that the
Court has feared all along.213
At what point then does a court become obligated to pierce the
statistical curtain of disparity studies and probe the logic of categorymaking behind it? While the Supreme Court can rely on docket control to
avoid answering awkward questions, lower courts have no such luxury. As
the Who Question is increasingly raised in affirmative action litigation,
courts have begun to press its definitional aspects through the rubric of
narrow tailoring. Yet, the Supreme Court’s silence has led to doctrinal
confusion. Courts also lack access to the kind of empirical evidence the
Who Question demands.

unravel the complexities of race (to use Justice Powell’s terminology), the Court instead
treats race as a Gordian knot, a tangle of “suspect” and “corrosive” stereotypes to be cut
through by strict scrutiny.
212
See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (majority); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-301
nn.1-7 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (giving statistics to document).
213
Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
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To confront the Who Question ultimately means navigating the
minefield of race and addressing its enduring significance in society. Faced
with this challenge, Justice Powell recoiled, declining to engage in the
“variable sociological and political analysis” required.214 Indeed, not only
Powell questioned whether such analysis was feasible, but also whether it
would be desirable.215

Instead, Justice Powell retreats into a kind of

historical relativism in which everyone has suffered and thus no one claim
stands above another. As an empirical matter, this accounting of racial
equities seems seriously flawed.

Even if other groups have suffered

historically, the real issue is where do the effects of discrimination linger
today.216 Justices O’Connor and Powell seem to confuse this point almost
willfully. They situate societal discrimination entirely in the past and then
plead helplessness before the fog of history.
This deliberate distancing of constitutional equality review from the
societal realities of race has long been subject to a broader critique by
constitutional scholars and critical race theorists.217

Such critics have

argued for an alternative approach that would contextualize the Court’s
inquiry and redirect affirmative action toward eradicating societal
hierarchies.218 In Gratz v. Bollinger, Justice Ginsburg cites a wealth of
social science research documenting the enduring racial disparities which
persist “[i]n the wake of ‘a system of racial caste system only recently

214

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297. On its face, Powell was merely stating that this analysis lay
outside the judicial competence. However, neither he nor any other member of the Court
has suggested that a societal analysis conducted by any other branch of government would
past muster.
215
See id.
216
See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 463 (purpose of preferential remedies is to address
present effect of past discrimination).
217
See, e.g. Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1314-18; Gotanda, supra note xx, at 40-47.
218
The Court has taken notice of de facto caste systems in other contexts. See
Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 476-77 (describing social exclusion of Mexican-Americans). Cf.
Haney López, supra note xx, at 1163 (arguing for generalization of Hernandez approach).
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ended.’”219

Members of racial minorities—in particular Hispanics and

Blacks—are shown to fare much worse than Whites across a wide range of
societal indicators.220

Such scholarship would seem to belie Justice

O’Connor’s claims that the effects of societal discrimination are “inherently
unmeasurable.”
As a prudential matter, however, was Powell right? Even if societal
evidence could be meaningfully evaluated by the Court, should it decline
the opportunity? Is dabbling in racial reengineering on a societal scale
sufficiently fraught with danger that it should be avoided? Other members
of the Court have conjured similarly ominous visions of such a project,
invoking Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa as the legal precedents
we would have to draw upon.221 Yet, these admittedly distasteful examples
do not exhaust the list of available models. There is another country which
has committed itself to societal reengineering which may offer a more
appealing precedent. That country is India.

II.

Lessons From Abroad: Does India Hold the Answer?
A.

India’s Empirical Approach

Like the US, India is a diverse, multi-ethnic democracy struggling to
overcome the legacy of centuries of officially-sanctioned segregation and
discrimination. Although Indian affirmative action focuses on caste, not

219

See Gratz 539 U.S. at 299 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)).
220
See Gratz 539 U.S. at 299-303 & especially nn.1-9 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). An amicus brief submitted by the American Sociological Association offered
an even more comprehensive compilation of scholarship on racial disadvantage. See Brief
of the American Sociological Association, et. al., 2002 U.S. Briefs 241 (2003).
221
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that objective
administration of racial classifications will require emulation of Nazi Reich’s Citizenship
Law of November 14, 1935); Metro. Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (facetious citation to Apartheid statute from South Africa).
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race, there are close parallels. In both cases, beneficiary groups are defined
primarily by ancestry (unlike, e.g. Brazilian affirmative action which is
based on color).222 India and the US also share the common challenge of
sorting through competing claims to entitlement from a diversity of groups
(unlike, e.g., in Malaysia or Fiji, where affirmative action focuses solely on
one group).223 Like the US, India operates under a Common Law tradition.
Moreover, its written constitution interpreted by an activist judiciary
adheres closely to the US model of public law.224
Unlike the US Supreme Court, however, which rejected any attempt
to measure societal discrimination, India has developed a rather
sophisticated methodology to measure such effects empirically. A series of
high-profile national commissions have studied the problem, and the
selection criteria they developed have been extensively litigated, with
several cases reaching the Indian Supreme Court.
The purpose of affirmative action in India is to remedy the societal
effects of caste discrimination.225 The caste system began as a hierarchical
system of social ordering within the framework of traditional Hindu belief.
Based on birth, caste membership determined one’s station in society.
Groups at the top of the hierarchy enjoyed superior resources, status, and
privilege, while those at the bottom endured ostracism and abuse.
Broad parallels exist between Indian caste and American race.
There were five categories in the traditional caste system—not unlike the
five racial groups we identify in the US. Ranked in descending order in the
222

Seth Racusen, Making the “Impossible” Determination: Flexible Identity and
Targeted Opportunity in Contemporary Brazil, 36 CONN. L. REV. 787 (2004).
223
SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note xx.
224
Cunningham & Menon, supra note xx. In this respect, India’s legal system has
more in common with the US than other common law systems whose adherence to
traditional English notions of parliamentary supremacy and unwritten constitutionalism
inhibit the role that courts play in policy-making.
225
Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC.C.C. 217 (1992).
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hierarchy, Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras made up the four
official castes or varnas.

Beneath them (and outside the formal caste

system) were the “outcastes,” or so-called “untouchables.”
At each of these five levels, the broader categories divide into
smaller caste groups known as jatis (or jats), just as racial groups in the US
are sometimes broken down by ethnicity or national origin.226 The jatis
were the focus of caste identities; they determined what you did for a living,
where you lived, the deities you worshipped, the foods you ate, and whom
you could marry.227 Even today, such identities exert powerful influence on
Indian life. To be born to a lower caste retains an enduring stigma.
Officially, caste discrimination has been banned.

Yet, as with

Segregation in the US, patterns of disadvantage continue. And because the
caste system had a pyramidical structure, there are many groups in the
lower echelons that can plausibly claim to experience such disadvantage—
not unlike the “majority of minorities” that Justice Powell talked about in
Bakke. However, where Powell rejected any attempt to choose between
competing groups, India does exactly that.
The starting point in this process remains the caste hierarchy. For
the groups at the very bottom—the so-called Scheduled Castes and
Tribes—traditional status alone determines eligibility.228 Under the Indian
constitution, these groups are automatically allotted a “reservation” (quota)
for

all

civil

service

jobs,

university

admissions,

and

electoral

representation.229

226

JENKINS, supra note xx at 85.
check on deitiesXXX caste elders as governance.
228
The Scheduled Castes consist mostly of the former untouchables (now known as
Dalits), while the Scheduled Tribes comprise tribal groups isolated from mainstream
society.
229
JENKINS, supra note xx at 2.
227
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For a much larger group of affirmative action beneficiaries,
however, known as the “other backward classes” (or OBCs), caste
disadvantage is no longer presumed from traditional status alone.230 Some
lower caste groups (jatis) have become landowners and gained political
power. Others have moved to urban areas where economic opportunities
enable upward mobility. Therefore, in order to be included in affirmative
action set-asides, each jat has to demonstrate that it’s still “backward”—a
term of art in Indian affirmative action law.231
The process of identifying “backward classes” remains the
responsibility of provincial government as caste differences vary by region.
“Backwardness” is determined empirically by looking at a wide range of
socio-economic indicators, analyzed on a group-by-group basis. In other
words, the caste (jat) as a whole is the unit of analysis.

The criteria

examined are specifically chosen to identify the systemic effects of caste
disadvantage.
Both the breadth of criteria and level of detail to which such analysis
extends are impressive. One standard form used to collect this information
runs over seventeen pages.232 The factors considered include the average
income and education level of caste members,233 literacy rates, occupational
profiles,234 land-ownership, capital resources, political representation (i.e.
number of caste members occupying elective or civil servant posts),
230

The term “backward classes” comes from the Indian Constitution and has been
interpreted to transcend traditional caste status and incorporate a broader assessment of
social standing. See Balaji v. Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649. The OBC receive a separate
quota from the Scheduled groups.
231
See JENKINS, supra note xxx at 197-214.
232
See “Questionnaire for consideration of requests for inclusion and complaints of
under-inclusion in the central list of Other Backward Classes” in Jenkins, supra note xxx at
197-214.
233
JENKINS, supra note xx at 208-209.
234
For example, the form inquires whether the caste is identified with a traditional
occupation, whether such hereditary occupation is regarded as “lowly, undignified, unclear
or stigmatized” or subject to bonded labor, and what proportion of the caste is still engaged
in such occupation. JENKINS, supra note xx, at 204-205.
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housing quality, and access to infrastructure (roads, electricity, irrigation,
etc.). The form also inquires whether the caste’s position has improved or
deteriorated during the last twenty years and requires applicants to furnish
names of other comparable caste groups.235
Wherever possible, the data are supposed to be disaggregated even
below the jat level. Thus, if an identifiable subgroup of the caste is doing
much better than the others, “backwardness” should be appraised for each
part separately so that the more “forward” part can be potentially excluded.
Similarly, individual caste members who have enjoyed unusually privileged
background may also be deemed ineligible.236
In other words, India attempts to choose beneficiary groups using
precisely the “sociological and political analysis” that Justice Powell
thought couldn’t or shouldn’t be attempted in the US. However, rather than
attempt to sort between competing historical claims of past discrimination,
India focuses on the here and now. The idea is that groups shown to
experience systemic disadvantage across a wide array of societal indicators
can be presumed to be the ones most afflicted by discrimination. Thus,
instead of accepting the existence of caste hierarchies as frozen in time,
India defines caste functionally in terms of subordination.
In drawing inferences of discrimination from empirical measures,
Indian methodology superficially resembles the underrepresentation model
of Croson. Both rely on counting to determine affirmative action eligibility.
However, very different kinds of counting are involved: Whereas India
focuses on societal disadvantage, Croson confines its analysis to
particularized contexts.

India also employs a multifactoral, systemic
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Id. at 214.
This skimming off of the so-called “creamy layer” of caste elites is constitutionally
required. See Indra Sawhney 3 S.C.C. 217. Thus, OBC membership only creates a
rebuttable presumption of eligibility.
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analysis, whereas counting in the US focuses solely on a single indicator:
group representation.
The units being counted are also sized very differently.

Most

disparity studies under Croson collect statistics based on the standard four
“minority” categories, roughly analogous to India’s varnas. Tongans are
thus lumped together with Bangladeshis in a pan-Asian grouping.

By

contrast, India’s counting focuses on the jatis—the smaller units that make
up each varna, the equivalent of counting Samoans and Bangladeshis
separately. Unlike the US, India’s regional analysis is also sensitive to local
variations in caste identities.
Fundamentally different assumptions underlie these quantitative
measures. In the US, a statistically significant disparity is taken as prima
facie evidence of unlawful discrimination. At least in theory, the counting
is supposed to uncover actual “statutory or constitutional violations”
traceable to the very institution seeking to grant the remedy. By contrast,
India makes no effort to assign individual responsibility.

It seeks to

measure the systemic effects of enduring caste discrimination irrespective
of their cause.
To some extent these different emphases can be ascribed to
differences in the way race and caste are conceived. In the US, race is often
considered an immutable trait, inhering in highly visible—albeit superficial
and morally irrelevant—characteristics such as skin color.

Racial

discrimination is conceived of in terms of discrete acts of irrational
prejudice

triggered

by

such

phenotypic

stimuli.237

Remedying

discrimination thus entails neutralizing individual bad actors as opposed to
broader institutional change.238

237
238

Gotanda, supra note xx, at 45.
Id.
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In India, however, caste is less associated with immutable traits, but
instead inheres in explicit social hierarchies. Since caste is itself defined
societally, it is more natural to think of caste discrimination as a societal
problem that must be addressed systemically.
B.

From India to the US: Applying the Model

For some, the Indian approach based on societal disadvantage offers
a more attractive means of selecting beneficiaries. The preoccupation with
identifying intentional bias in US law has been criticized for employing
unrealistic assumptions about the etiology of discrimination.239 Rather than
focusing myopically on identifiable “bad actors,” commentators have
stressed the need to address systemic patterns of disadvantage.240 Several
have called for the Fourteenth Amendment to be reinterpreted to move from
an “antidiscrimination model” to an “antisubordination model.”241

In

proposing such a paradigm shift, Cass Sunstein uses the metaphor of a
“Constitution of Caste,” and, in fact, his definition of “caste” in terms of
systemic societal disadvantage is reminiscent of the way India actually goes
about identifying “backwardness.”242
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See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil
Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251.
240
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Discrimination through Equal Protection 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (contrasting “perpetrator vs. victim” perspectives on
discrimination). Some commentators also argue that the Court’s existing jurisprudence
already contains the seeds for such a paradigm shift. E.g. Ian F. Haney López, Race,
Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1997)
241
See, e.g. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, PHILOSOPHY AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 5; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003; Haney López, supra note xxx.
242
See Cunningham & Menon, supra note xx (commenting on Sunstein’s paper and
drawing explicit comparisons with the Indian example); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cultural Comparisons, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1311. Cf. Gratz,
supra note xx at 299-300 (Ginnsburg, J. concurring) (similarly likening America’s racial
inequalities to a caste system).
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That India offers a working model of an antisubordination program
has not gone unnoticed by scholars of comparative affirmative action.243 In
advocating India’s approach to the US Supreme Court, the amicus scholars
made the case that by penetrating the “amorphous” nature of societal
discrimination, the empirical validation supplied by Indian methodology
could overcome jurisprudential resistance to societal remedies.244 On its
face, the multifactoral analysis applied under the Indian approach does seem
like a more rational answer to the Who Question. Whereas Croson tells us
simply to count heads without much thought about their underlying
meaning, India employs empirical measures specifically chosen to correlate
with the social phenomenon being targeted. Moreover, by analyzing the
narrowest possible units—jatis instead of varnas—using definitions tailored
to local context, the Indian approach achieves a greater degree of precision
which helps to avoid under- or under-inclusive remedies and thus reduces
the concern over definitional issues.245
India is able to work with smaller units because it is looking at caste
societally, using a composite of many factors to map social hierarchies. In
looking at this broader picture of underprivilege, group size becomes less of
a limitation than with Croson’s statistical analyses of representation. By
determining affirmative action eligibility through a centralized process,
India’s approach is also more efficient than the multiple disparity studies
that Croson demands for every particularized context.
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Cunningham & Menon, supra note xx; amicus scholars, supra note xx, at 874-75.
Amicus scholars, supra note xx at 874, 881 (“India’s experience shows without a
doubt that it is possible to design a program to remedy the effect of past discrimination in
which beneficiary groups are designated through an objective process based on empirical
research”).
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Smaller groups also generally have better defined identities, a phenomenon that
applies in the US as much as in India. See infra notes xx. Therefore, while counting small
groups does not eliminate definitional ambiguity, it minimizes it.
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How might such a model translate to the US context? To return to
the case of Rocco Luiere, recall the key question was whether Iberians
experienced the same patterns of racial disadvantage as other Hispanics.
Applying Indian methodology, this question could be answered by
analyzing empirical data.
The idea would be to use societal disadvantage as a proxy for racial
prejudice.

This would entail gathering statistics on Iberians and other

Hispanic subgroups, using appropriate criteria chosen to quantify patterns
of racial subordination in the US.246 This might include examining access
to education, average household wealth, patterns of residential segregation,
rates of inter-racial marriage,
similar criteria.

247

political representation, and a host of

If it turns out that Iberians do much better on these

measures than Latinos, this could mean they’re not experiencing the same
patterns of discrimination.248
In fact, data from the 2000 US Census reveals that on several such
measures, Iberians are differently situated from other Hispanic groups.
They are significantly wealthier, better educated, and engaged in higher
status occupations than Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, who make
up the bulk of US Hispanics249; indeed, on many measures Iberians
outperform the US population at large. Almost twice as many American
Spaniards, for example, hold a graduate degree than the US average; they
are 25% better represented in managerial or professional occupations; and
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See Amicus scholars, supra note xx at 873 n.216 (pointing to intermarriage rates
and patterns of “White flight”).
247
Id.
248
As in India, a contextualized analysis would be required to account for possible
regional variations.
249
Mexican-Americans (or Chicanos) are by far the largest Hispanic subgroup
represented almost 60% of the total. Puerto Ricans account for just under 10%. See Table
III for census data on Hispanic subgroups.
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they own homes valued at 36% above the national median.250 MexicanAmericans and Puerto Ricans living on the US Mainland, by contrast, rank
well below the US average on all of these measures.251
Table III - Socioeconomic Breakdown of Hispanic Subgroups
Education
Population Group

ALL US
HISPANIC

Occupation

Property

Income

% earning degree Managerial or Median Home
% below
Bachelors Graduate Professional
Value
Poverty Level

8.8%

33.6%

6.7%

3.8%

18.1%

$105,600

22.6%

Argentinean
Spaniard

16.2%
16.2%

19.0%
13.7%

42.5%
42.0%

$180,000
$162,100

13.8%
12.7%

Portuguese
South American
Cuban
Central American
Puerto Rican
Mexican

13.0%
14.5%
11.5%
6.2%
8.3%
5.0%
9.5%

6.0%
10.6%
9.6%
3.4%
4.2%
2.4%

29.9%
27.7%
31.6%
13.3%
24.2%
14.9%

$160,100
$153,100
$135,700
$131,400
$112,500
$95,300

8.1%
15.0%
15.0%
19.9%
26.0%
23.5%

4.8%

25.2%

$80,600

24.9%

BLACKS

15.5%

$119,600

12.4%

Source: 2000 U.S. Census

If one accepts such societal indicators as appropriate criteria to
determine affirmative action eligibility, the case for including Iberians
seems weak.252

Even if the popular consensus would regard them as

Hispanic, they appear less burdened by the systemic handicaps associated
with the larger group.253 It may be that the success of Spaniards comes in
spite of race, not because of it. But it is also possible that these differences
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Portuguese-Americans do slightly less well than Spaniards on these measures.
They are somewhat less likely to hold a college degree or be a manager/professional than
the average US resident. But they experience poverty at only 2/3 the national rate and the
median value of their homes exceeds that of the general populace by 34%. See Table III.
251
Mexican-Americans, for example, earn graduate degrees at a quarter the rate of the
US average, they are only half as well represented in the managerial/professional classes,
and their home values rank 20% below the national median. See Table III.
252
A similar argument could be made for excluding Hispanics of South American and
Cuban origin. Argentine-Americans fare particularly well on these measures, outstripping
even Spaniards.
253
The popular consensus is, in any case, influenced by the terms on which formal
race categories are constructed. Shifting to a narrower Latino classification would
arguably reduce the tendency of the public to associate Iberians with other Hispanics.
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in societal standing reflect genuine difference in how such subgroups
experience race. Scholars have identified intra-Hispanic disparities based
on skin color.254 The lighter skin and European features of Spaniards could
permit them to function more easily in mainstream US society. It is also
possible that class differences may themselves insulate societally successful
Hispanics from the patterns of prejudice that other group members
encounter.
This does not mean that Rocco Luiere would never encounter racial
prejudice, but it does suggest that Iberians, like Jews or Irish, have learned
to navigate around it. And we may want to focus our affirmative action
efforts on groups that are being held back. Since most affirmative action
definitions of “Hispanic” still do include Iberians, a disadvantage approach
would thus lead to a narrowing of eligibility. A disadvantage approach
could also be used to resist new claimants.

Rather than keeping out

Persian-Americans on the spurious grounds relied on by the SBA, a similar
result could be justified based on empirical data.255
The amicus scholars have proposed generalizing such inquiries to
“redraw the map” around which our racial compass is oriented. They call
for a “national bipartisan commission” to be convened to replace the
standard categories of the quadrangle with “scientifically” redesigned
groupings built around systemic disadvantage.256

Newly fashioned

empirically-validated categories could then serve to allocate affirmative
action remedies in a more targeted, rationally defensible fashion.257
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See Edward E. Telles & Edward Murguia, Phenotypic Discrimination and Income
Differences amond Mexican Americans, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 683 (1990).
Telles & Murguia, supra note xx.
255
Census data belies any claim that Persian-Americans face societal disadvantage
systemically. [To be added to Appendix].
256
Amicus scholars, supra note xx at 880-81.
257
Id. at 882.
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The amicus scholars appear to contemplate using India’s model to
answer the selection question directly based on societal disadvantage, as
done in India itself. This Article argues against such an approach, but will
suggest more modest definitional uses of Indian methodology.
C.

Demographic Challenges

Assuming that constitutional objections to a societal approach could
be circumvented,

could an Indian-style disadvantage model provide a

workable answer to the Who Question as the amicus scholars suggest?
There are significant differences in moving to the US context that would
complicate the analysis required to implement it. Moreover, even if such an
approach proved workable, a further question remains whether the
consequences would be desirable. Arguably, Justice Powell was right to
resist societal rankings on prudential grounds. If so, the Indian model may
serve as a negative example, more cautionary lesson than model to emulate.
Exploring the reasons why points to some of the dangers lurking within the
Who Question.
First, consider the demographic contrasts. India remains a largely
rural society in which patterns of caste oppression have been entrenched
literally over millennia.258 As a result, caste identities remain well defined.
Most caste groups still live in their traditional villages and engage in timehonored occupations. Inter-caste marriage is virtually unknown. Given
these relatively stable baseline conditions, Indian policy-makers can
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Affirmative action has had some effect in empowering an elite drawn from at least
some lower caste groups. However, its benefits have been limited in comparison to the
pool of potential beneficiaries, and, as in the US, have generally gone to those who need it
the least. Many lower caste groups, particularly those at the bottom end, are either not in a
position to take advantage of affirmative action, or in many cases, are simply unaware of
its availability. As a result, the SC/ST reservations often go unfilled. Jehangir S. Pocha,
Caste Prejudice, Red Tape, Access to Villages are Hampering Government's Relief Efforts,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2005 at A10; SOWELL, supra note xxx, at xx.

65

generally presume that empirical disadvantage flows from the lingering
effects of caste, as opposed to extrinsic causes.
By contrast, the United States is a nation of immigrants, with a high
degree of geographic and social mobility. Although “ethnic niches” in the
workforce still exist,259 occupational diversity is increasingly the rule.
Ethnic and racial identities are not as well defined, and inter-racial marriage
rates are rising. This makes the dynamics of group disadvantage much more
difficult to model because it requires analyses of ambiguous and moving
targets.
Dealing with immigration effects would present a particular
challenge, one which the amicus scholars as well as many subordination
theorists appear to overlook.260 Immigrants typically arrive in positions of
relative disadvantage and then progress up the socio-economic ladder. In
general, the longer they have been in the country, the better they do.261
Such “immigration effects” skew socio-economic measures of status, and
for groups with high rates of immigration, the distortions can be
appreciable.

If we consider affirmative action more properly aimed at

targeting forms of racial disadvantage that go beyond such transitory
phenomena, we would need appropriate adjustments to isolate patterns of
“intractable disadvantage” unrelated to immigration.262
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See generally Malamud, supra note xx, at 327-329.
The amicus scholars begin with a “mad bomber” parable that posits a model of
lingering disadvantage traceable to a unitary injury at time zero. This model fails to
address the phenomenon of immigration as a independent variable correlating with societal
disadvantage. Amicus scholars, supra note xx, at 836.
261
Many components contribute to success in navigating US society: familiarity with
US customs, employment skills, language ability, social capital (“connections”), financial
resources, etc. All of these take time to cultivate.
262
Brest & Oshige, supra note xxx uses the concept “intractable disadvantage” to
describe such multi-generational trends. Others might be even more demanding and seek
to limit affirmative action solely to disadvantage that is due to (as opposed to merely
correlative with) race.
260
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This is more easily said than done. Adjusting for “immigration
effects” requires dealing with myriad causal variables. Immigrants begin at
differing starting points and their ability to progress also varies, based on
the circumstances they face upon arrival.263 Many Hispanics have come
across the border from Mexico or Central America, often illegally, from
poor, rural communities, with little education, and then remain concentrated
in linguistically isolated communities which resist assimilation.264

By

contrast, Argentinean and Indian immigrants often arrive with higher
education degrees in hand and go on to achieve greater successes.
In general, Asian immigrants seem more successful at economically
integrating than Hispanics. Language ability may account for at least part
of this discrepancy. Roughly the same percentage of Asians as Hispanics
are recent immigrants.265 However, almost half of foreign-born Hispanics
lack the ability to function adequately in English compared to just over a
quarter of their Asians counterparts. About one in five Hispanic immigrants
speak English “not at all” compared to a mere 5.6% of Asians.
Accordingly, even legal Hispanic immigrants often remain excluded from
opportunities for upward mobility. On the other hand, Hispanics do not
seem to face the same barriers to spatial mobility as Blacks, suggesting that
their segregation is more a cultural choice than a condition of racism.266
Second generation Hispanics are also much more likely marry outside their
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.See Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration
Prisons in the United States, 10 PUBLIC CULTURE 577-606 (1998) (contrasting varying
conditions met by Haitians vs. Marielitos in 1980s); Anthony DePalma, 15 Years on the
Bottom Rung, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005 at A1 (contrasting Greek vs. Mexican immigrant
experience).
264
GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 182-183; DePalma, supra note xx.
265
2000 U.S. Census data, on file with the author.
266
See Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: the Perpetuation of
the Underclass, in John Arthur & Amy Shapiro, ed., COLOR CLASS IDENTITY: THE NEW
POLITICS OF RACE, 138-39 (1996).
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racial groups than African-Americans, suggesting less ingrained racial
antipathy against them.267
Nonetheless, there are clearly some Hispanic communities that have
been held back for generations at least partly due to racism. Isolating such
“racial effects” from other contingent variables requires making a number
of subjective assumptions about the dynamics of racial prejudice,
“institutional racism,” and the uncertain divide between culture and race,268
all of which would severely test our understanding of “race” as a construct.
Faced with such a demographic and sociological challenge, even the
best social scientists given infinite time and resources might find it difficult
to choose between competing claims of disadvantage in a way that would
be generally accepted as fair, even assuming we could agree on what we
were looking for.
D.

Politicization and Backlash

In any case, in the real world, we should not expect that
“disadvantage” would be determined through neutral social science because
the whole process would inevitably become politicized. Competing interest
groups would lobby for favorable criteria and attempt to “game” the system.
Threshold standards would be hard to maintain. All of this has happened in
India. Reservation politics has influenced election campaigns and attracted
corruption. New groups are constantly being added to the OBC ranks, but
very few ever get taken off the lists.
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See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 193.
For example, is it really race that explains why Jamaicans succeed in place of AfroAmericans? If one says Jamaicans have a stronger work ethic, that’s cultural. But if one
says that domestic Blacks have a reputation for being lazy, that’s racist stereotyping.
Similarly, rates of exogamy (intermarriage) are often viewed as a proxy for societal
prejudice. Yet, some groups exhibit preferences for endogamy for cultural reasons that
have nothing to do with how outsiders view them.
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In this sense, the idealized account of Indian methodology provided
by the amicus scholars requires a dose of legal realism. Given the more
complex and contestable terrain which the implementation of a
“disadvantage model” in the US would have to negotiable, one might
expect the scope for politicization and manipulation of the process to
increase.
We already see a similar politicization of the disparity testing that
contracting programs do under Croson, which critics have accused of
relying on phony social science to achieve predetermined ends.269 And as
we saw, the process of creating the categories we now use to count with was
also not without its politics.

Yet, disparity testing is confined to a

particularized context, and usually involves a contest between industry
insiders, unbeknownst to the general public. Similarly, the racial prehistory
of the quadrangle largely took place behind closed doors.
By contrast, moving to an Indian model would place the Who
Question on a much more visible plane.

Determinations as to

“backwardness” concern the membership of the caste as a whole and
involve a holistic assessment of group standing, not in a limited context, but
globally in society. Making such assessments inevitably pits competing
groups against one another in an adversarial process. At stake, is not just
eligibility for one program in one sector, but affirmative action benefits
across the board. The result is a much more competitive, high profile
contest where the winners take all. Inevitably, caste consciousness has
become sharpened, not reduced in the process.270
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George R. LaNoue, supra note xx, at 12-13.
Clark Cunningham (one of the amicus scholars) has in subsequent writing
acknowledged “the widespread concern in India that caste identity has become more
salient, not less” since implementation of the Mandal Report’s methodology for identifying
the OBC. Clark Cunningham After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The American Debate
Over Affirmative Action is Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas from Abroad, 36 CONN. L.
270
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This may seem an acceptable price to pay in a country where caste
identities have already been entrenched as an instrument of oppression over
three thousand years.271 Yet, racial identities in the US are not so welldefined. As with our demographics, race presents a moving target. US
census categories have changed dramatically over the years with all kinds of
categories dropping in and out; they continue to be redefined today.272
These changes arguably reflect an organic evolution of racial
identities, a process in which the legal categories used in affirmative action
have generally lagged behind.

The relative indeterminacy of such

categories may therefore serve a positive value by enabling a space for
further organic progression. Likewise, an avoidance of overt intergroup
rivalries helps to minimize the hardening of such identities through forced
political mobilizations. The Who Question thus has its tradeoffs. Gains in
distributive or corrective justice from pursuing increased precision and
clarity might be outweighed by sharpened group consciousness and
polarization.273
The competitive element of Indian affirmative action has other
troubling features. Because more “forward” groups tend to usurp a lion’s
share of benefits, groups ranked lower down the hierarchy inevitably

REV. 665, 675 (2004). Affirmative action opponents in the US often describe similar
polarizing effects here as well. See, e.g. Krieger, supra note xx. However, the identity of
the privileged groups is relatively stable, and so there is less polarizing competition
between minority groups.
271
I do not mean to overemphasize the rigidity of caste identities in India or to deny
the existence of grey areas. The formal categories used by the state (often the legacy of
British colonial administrators) reflect an arbitrary and/or essentializing imposition of order
on far more complex social reality. My point is only a comparative one. Most people
could at least agree on a basic division of groups at the varna level (including its
hierarchical ordering) and this consensus understanding has remained relatively stable over
time.
272
YANOW, supra note xx, at 83-85 (charting evolution of categories); supra notes xx.
273
Cunningham acknowledges “[t]he concern that the fruit of ‘strict scrutiny’ of group
selection and definition might be a counter-productive perpetuation of racial identity.”
Cunningham, supra note xx, at 675.
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demand their own separate quotas. India already has two established tiers
of beneficiaries, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes having precedence
over the Other Backward Classes. Competition within these groups has
increasingly led to further distinctions whereby groups deemed “more
disadvantaged” demand separate reservations, requiring ever more intricate
rankings.274 Again, for a country dealing with the effects of an entrenched
caste system, such inverted hierarchies may seem like an acceptable, even
desirable remedy. South Africa has taken a similar approach: prioritizing
affirmative action eligibility according to the degree of oppression that the
various beneficiary groups experienced under Apartheid (which was itself a
rigidly hierarchical system).275
Clark Cunningham has hypothesized an analogous remedial
hierarchy in which Blacks and American Indians—the two groups that
suffered the greatest historical injury in the US—would become privileged
as claimants of affirmative action.276 Several courts have hinted that narrow
tailoring may require that such distinctions be made.277 There is certainly a
strong case to be made for African-American exceptionalism, and
Cunningham is not the only one to advance it in the context of affirmative
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SOWELL, supra note xx. The Indian Supreme Court recently struck down subquotas
for the SC/ST as contrary to the constitutional mandate. However, the OBC apparently
remain fair game for stratified remedies.
275
SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note xx.
276
Cunningham, supra note xx, at 673 (drawing a further analogy comparing Black
and Indians with, respectively, India’s Scheduled Castes and Tribes). Cunningham stresses
in a footnote that the analogy is made for illustrative purposes only, not as an “import
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revealing, for example, that the SBA justified its MBE set-asides by emphasizing the
unique historical experience of these two groups. See LaNoue & Sullivan, Presumptions,
supra note xx, at 450 (quoting SBA interim rule explaining that “blacks had suffered
‘enslavement and subsequent disfranchisement’ and Indians had endured ‘near
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See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955 n.50 (“one would intuit that the minority group that
has experienced the most discrimination . . . would be entitled to the most benefit from the
designated remedy.”); Assoc. for Fairness in Bus. v. State, 82 F. Supp. 2d at353, 362
(D.N.J. 2000) (same); Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (same).
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action.278 However, such an approach runs strongly against the grain of
American egalitarianism. Even from start, when affirmative action was so
clearly focused on redressing injustices against Negroes, policy-makers
were reluctant to single out any one group for preferential treatment. This
reluctance to play favorites in favoritism appears to be widely shared, even
among African-Americans themselves.279 Similarly, it’s notable that claims
based on Native American singularity have focused on reclaiming
traditional homelands and privileges rather than the sort of generalized
preferences across society that indigenous groups, e.g., in Malaysia or Fiji
have demanded through affirmative action.
Making such formalized reckonings of comparative disadvantage
and entitlement would risk offending American egalitarian values. The US
likes to think of itself as a classless society and a nation founded on
universal equality. However imperfectly that ideal has been applied in
practice, we would likely be uncomfortable with a hierarchical system of
affirmative action that so overtly belied it.

Even with a single-tiered

system, the spectacle of groups competing in a collective airing of dirty
linen would be one that many Americans would instinctively resist
Justice Powell averted to such concerns in Bakke when, after
dismissing a sociological ranking of racial disadvantage as outside the
judicial competence, he questioned whether such rankings would even be
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See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Glenn C. Loury, Double Talk,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 23; Orlando Patterson, THE ORDEAL OF
INTEGRATION, at 192-193; Nathan Glazer, cited in GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 132.
279
African-Americans have, at times, protested at the diminishment of their share of
the affirmative action pie caused by admission of other beneficiary groups. However,
Black leadership groups have consistently espoused solidarity between “people of color.”
Such coalition-building serves broader political interests, but may also reflect a calculation
that affirmative action would be vulnerable if Blacks were the only beneficiaries. Studies
have also shown that African-Americans would be loathe to assume the stigma of being the
only group singled out for special benefits. David Sabbagh, Affirmative Action Policies:
An International Perspective (unpublished paper on file with the author).
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“politically feasible and socially desirable.”280 Powell’s solution in Bakke
was to advance a model of “pluses” awarded based on an individualized
assessment of each applicant’s diversity contribution. Powell’s approach
thus preserves a symbolic commitment to individualism, maintaining the
illusion that everyone can compete equally with no group enjoying a
superior a priori claim.281 Likewise, Croson’s disparity testing reduces
group entitlement to a question of statistics in which no group appears to be
a priori favored and findings of disadvantage are localized within a
particular context.

These approaches run directly contrary to the Indian

approach of targeted reservations based on explicit reckonings of
comparative societal disadvantage.
E.

Purposeful Confusion

This Article has thus far deferred discussing the underlying
normative theories that govern affirmative action. However, if we are to
understand “race” in the functional manner that this Article proposes, clarity
as to rationale is essential. In India, the rationale for affirmative action is
fairly well-defined: to remedy the societal effects of caste discrimination.
Such normative clarity permits India to concentrate on identifying
beneficiaries in a precise and transparent fashion.
By contrast, five decades into affirmative action, America has yet to
reach consensus on what such programs seek to accomplish. Affirmative
action crept into our public life almost without debate and then proliferated
in an atmosphere of racial crisis. An original focus on remedying historical
injustice expanded to embrace broader objectives.

Yet, despite a now

substantial body of affirmative action case law, the range of constitutionally
280

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297.
See Sean Pager, Strictness & Subsidiarity: An Institutional Perspective on
Affirmative Action at the European Court of Justice, 26 B.C INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35
(2003) (comparing similar approach taken by ECJ).
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permissible rationales in the US remains uncertain.282 Affirmative action in
the US is thus characterized by normative indeterminacy, with different
people ascribing to it very different aims. 283
Such uncertainty hampers our ability to answer the Who Question.
Talking about who requires a normative theory as to why. A big reason we
don’t talk about the who may be because we cannot agree on the why. We
have at least two different sets of rationales—diversity and remedy—whose
various strands and formulations are themselves subject to considerable
ambiguity.

If you press these ambiguities, they point you in different

directions as to which groups you might select as beneficiaries.
The diversity rationale, in particular, encompasses a dense thicket of
overlapping goals. Justice Powell’s original account of diversity in Bakke
contemplated a kind of Noah’s Ark in which universities seek the student
body equivalent of “two of everything,” with race functioning as only one
“plus” factor among many in the quest to showcase the full taxonomic
variety of human kind.284 The Michigan Law School plan upheld in Grutter
departs from this model by focusing almost exclusively on ensuring that
certain racial groups were fully represented in “critical masses,” while
making no real allowance for diversity from any other source, ethnic or
otherwise.285
The theoretical basis on which Grutter defends diversity also
presents a far muddier account of the project.

It moves from Bakke’s

emphasis on the heuristic benefits of diversity as an educational tool to a
282

Indeed, if anything, Grutter made the picture less clear when it opened the door to
as-yet untested rationales by disowning previous language in Croson suggesting that only
past discrimination could justify racial preferences. Cunningham, supra note xx, at 672.
283
For example, defenders of racial preferences commonly invoke justifications such
as role models and service to minority communities which the Supreme Court has
seemingly rejected. See, e.g. Brest & Oshige, supra note xx, (defending such a broader
reckoning of normative aims).
284
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322-23.
285
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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novel account of its function in legitimizing elite institutions. Along the
way, it also defends diversity as providing a civics lesson in “cross-racial
understanding,” a response to globalization, and a public service to
corporate recruiters.286 Taken literally, each of these normative theories has
different implications for the groups who would be included.
The problems posed by immigration prove particularly vexatious.
Because such new arrivals often lack a history of persecution on US shores,
their inclusion in affirmative action has stirred occasional controversy.287
However, just as the original categories have expanded to embrace new
additions, the rationales for affirmative action have been similarly stretched
to accommodate them.288
Should foreign-born immigrants count for diversity purposes? It
depends on what you think diversity is designed to accomplish. If it’s to
expose students to a kind of model UN which helps them compete in the
global marketplace, then the more immigrants the better. And why limit it
to immigrants of color? Alternatively, if it’s the “unique experience of
being a racial minority” in the US which we seek to bring into the
classroom, then immigrants may not serve the purpose as well, if their
formative years were spent elsewhere. This is not an abstract question. The
University of Texas explicitly excluded Black immigrants from affirmative
action.289 Evidence that children of African and Caribbean immigrants are
286

Id. at 306.
See GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 132 (quoting Lawrence Fuchs, a prominent civil
rights thinker, as describing the inclusion of immigrants as “a historical accident for which
there is no possible justification”); see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, ORDEAL OF
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA’S “RACIAL” CRISIS 193 (1998);
EDLEY, supra note xx, at 176.
288
See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action:
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677; GRAHAM, supra
note xx, at 195.
289
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4 (describing Texas’ admissions preferences as
applying only to “American blacks,” but not “a black citizen of Nigeria”). And at least one
federal court of appeals has questioned giving “African-American a hemispheric meaning.”
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displacing descendents of Negro slavery in elite universities has caused
concern elsewhere.290
Other

theories

of

diversity

point

to

similarly

conflicting

prescriptions. For example, Grutter emphasized the value of diversity as an
agent of societal legitimization by demonstrating that “the path to
leadership [is] visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity.”

Presumably, this “demonstration” is aimed most

directly at the specific groups whose representation is being furnished.
Therefore, a legitimization model argues for a definition of group
boundaries determined by the group itself because the model would only
work to the extent that the group accepted the admittee as its own. By
contrast, the rationale of promoting “cross-racial understanding” and
breaking down stereotypes would push in the direction of an externalized
view of race because the stereotypes being targeted are held by outsiders.
Depending on which perspective you adopt, you might end up with very
different groups.291
Similar ambiguities arise under a remedial rationale. This paper has
advocated defining beneficiaries based on the contours by which
discrimination is targeted.

One might ask, however, from whose

perspective is such “targeting” assessed: the victim, the perpetrator, or some
“objective” observer?292 Courts have sometimes assumed a “bigot’s-eye
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 159 (4th Cir. 1994) (questioning award of racial
scholarship to student from Jamaica).
290
See supra note xx. A similar controversy has arisen over foreign-born “minority”
faculty hires. GRAHAM, supra note xx, at 162 (reporting that 56% of University of
Michigan’s Asian faculty were foreign born and over half of all Stanford’s “minority”
hires). .
291
See McGowan, supra note xx, at 135 (describing asymmetries in perceptions of
racial identity). Normally, one would expect group insiders to make finer distinctions. Id.
at 133-34. But see Lee, supra note xx, at 184 (describing study in which AfricanAmericans accepted Black immigrants as “Black,” but Koreans merchants distinguished
them).
292
Of course, in practice, we may have very little information about the actual
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view” governs.293

However, what if the perpetrator was mistaken or

oblivious to the racial identity of his victims?294 To answer, we need a
clearer idea of what the remedy is designed to do. For example, to “make
whole” an aggrieved community, one might assume an insider perspective
to appease those whom the community regards as its own. A prophylactic
aim would push toward the bigot’s eye view because you need to know
who’s next in line.295 Or if the only point is corrective justice with respect
to individual, but unidentified victims, one might simply draw the narrowest
class who might plausibly have been harmed.
As with diversity, particular problems arise with respect to
immigration. For example, a city may have enacted a remedy based on
identified disparities in a Hispanic population composed mostly of Puerto
Ricans.

Whether Guatemalans migrants arriving after the remedy was

enacted should share its benefits depends on the purpose of the remedy.
Under a strictly retrospective view, one might argue that including
Guatemalans who have not actually suffered the discrimination could
violate narrow tailoring.296

However, if one considers the remedy as

designed to counteract ongoing patterns of discrimination then Guatemalans

targeting in so far as the “discrimination” is only inferred from statistical disparities.
293
See Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991) (defining race
from external perspective of discriminators); Montana Contractors, 460 F. Supp. at xx.
294
Cabbie Slain in Shooting, Fiery Crash, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2002 at B1
(describing Sikh mistaken for Arab). Racial animus need not be triggered by specific
stereotypes or racial hostility—it might be enough that the victims were simply of a visibly
different background and regarded as “the other.” Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L.
Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 'Regarded As' Black, and Why Title VII Should
Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White",2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (2005).
295
Cf. amicus scholars, supra note xx, at 872 (suggesting that selecting on the basis of
externally visible differences “makes sense if the primary purpose . . . is to provide a
prophylactic against anticipated future [discriminatory] behavior”).
296
Including subgroups who may not have been present at the time the discrimination
was measured, on a purely retrospective view could be equated to Richmond’s Aleuts. See
supra notes xxx and accompanying text.
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might be justifiably included to the extent such prejudice is likely to impact
them in the future.297
Case law on this question has been ambiguous.

Croson was

premised on an explicitly retrospective rationale that criticized Richmond
for including groups who had not “actually suffered” the discrimination
being remedied. However, courts have expressed differing views as to
whether a prophylactic remedy is precluded in other cases.298 At root lies
the undertheorized nature of racially-targeted remedies.

As anomalies

within the dominant individualist tenor of US equality law, existing
jurisprudence has yet to fully come to grips with their meaning.299
There are also fundamental ambiguities as to the meaning of
“discrimination” itself. Courts usually cognize racial prejudice in terms of
hostile acts of bigotry by identifiable individuals. Their rejection of societal
rationales for affirmative action stems in part from an aversion to notions of
racial guilt or entitlement.300

Cabining the Who Question within

particularized contexts serves this ideological project, but fails to address
more ambiguous structural barriers within such contexts.301
297

But see EDLEY, supra note xx (raising a “coming to the nuisance” rationale for
excluding such immigrants.)
298
Compare Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1408-09 (11th Cir.
1991), Ritchey Produce Co. v. State, 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio S.up. Ct.,.), with Assoc. Gen’l
Contractors of Ohio, 214 F.3d 730 (retrospective critique of same program).
299
Justifications for such group remedies have been hinted at in earlier Title VII cases,
but never definitively established. Compare Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 321 U.S. 324, 364-67 (1977) (purpose of group remedy limited to reaching actual or
potential victims of past discrimination) with Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l
Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 449-50, 477 (1986) (broader prospective goals of
reforming internal dynamics to remove ongoing barriers to minority advancement).
300
Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, concurring); Ronald Turner, The Too-ManyMinorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-Affirmative-Action Position: From
Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 445 (2003).
301
Such barriers may or may not reflect racial prejudice, and their implications remain
undertheorized. Similarly, a categorical tailoring model presupposes targeted bigotry
directed against identifiable groups. Yet, racial disparities often result from “Old Boy
networks” which benefit insiders out of self-interest more than discriminatory animus
against any particular “out” group. Existing doctrine fails to account for such a model, and
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These ambiguities in the rationales used to justify US affirmative
action limit our ability to answer the Who Question with any precision.302
To choose between divergent approaches, we would have to commit to a
normative theory of affirmative action, a task the Supreme Court has
managed to avoid.303

Our current methodology elides the question of

rationale, allowing us to remain agnostic. We simply count heads without
questioning whom we’re counting or why.
All of this suggests that there may be the sound reasons to avoid
pressing the Who Question too far if the benefits of precision and clarity
may come at too high a price. Of course, some would argue that the
solution lies in the abolition of racial preferences all together. Yet, for
better or worse, race-consciousness remains a project to which our nation
seems committed for the foreseeable future. Affirmative action arguably
fulfills a vital role in our national politics, serving as a form of collective
atonement for our racial sins. The failure of the Gingrich Revolution to
repeal federal affirmative action (something that the current Republican
majority has never even touched since) signaled that even conservatives
have grudgingly accepted this fait accompli.304 We might not be able to
agree on the precise objectives, but the overall direction remains fixed.

courts have disagreed as to its remedial implications. Compare Adarand Constructors,
Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1556 with Concrete Works, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1042.
302
There are, in any case, practical limits to the precision that can be achieved in
assessing pathways of racial targeting or diversity values. However, the ambiguities as to
purpose prevent us from even trying.
303
See Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 Ohio St. L. J.
79, 81 (1994) (describing incoherence resulting from Supreme Court majorities “papering
over strong philosophical differences”).
304
See id. (describing “broad societal acceptance” of affirmative action). This is not to
deny that race-conscious affirmative action remains controversial nor that efforts at
abolition continue. See Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis of
Proposition 209, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 3, 6-7 & n.24 (1999) (describing repeals of
affirmative action through voter initiative); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (describing the ‘Texas 10’
race neutral alternative).
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When there are no good answers, sometimes it’s better to leave our
options open. Intentionally opaque rulings can serve as a judicial strategy
to avoid entering unnecessarily divisive territory and preserve a space for
political compromise.305 Commentators often cite Justice Powell’s Bakke
opinion as Exhibit A. As they see it, Powell’s opinion represents a carefully
crafted formula that finesses the most objectionable and problematic aspects
of affirmative action.306

By preserving a symbolic commitment to

individualism, the opinion masks the realities of racial preferences in what
many have hailed as an act of statesmanlike genius.307
Some see Grutter and Gratz as continuing this legacy. The opinions
continue to pay rhetorical homage to flexibility and individuality, while
glossing over the problematic issue of “critical masses” and culminating in
split outcomes that seem to reward opaqueness over transparency.308
Croson contains its own jurisprudential genuflection to individualism, by
requiring provisions for waivers and challenges on a case by case basis.309
Croson also exploits crucial ambiguities as to the meaning of its “prima
facie” showing of discrimination and the degree of state involvement
contemplated by its “passive participation” theory.310
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Pildes & Niemi, supra note xx; Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1315.
See Keith J. Bybee, The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 263 (2000) (summarizing commentary).
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See, e.g. David Sabbagh, The Judicial Uses of Subterfuge, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 411,
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See Cunningham, supra note xx, at 676.
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Arguably, each of these gray areas represent carefully negotiated
political compromises perpetuated in the Court’s case law. Avoiding a
sharp resolution of the Who Question may be another example where such
strategic ambiguity serves a positive value. Powell’s rejection of societal
rankings epitomizes the determination of the Court to eschew the divisive
effect of resolving competing claims to racial injustice. By creating the
illusion that no group enjoys a superior a priori claim to “diversity,”
Powell’s Bakke opinion implicitly denies the societal reality of race.
Croson’s reliance on “objective” indicia of disparities similarly avoids any
need to look behind the numbers. It’s not that the Court cannot choose
between groups, but that it chooses not to.

III.

Finding the Balance
This paper has suggested there may be reason to hesitate before

pushing the Who Question too far. The argument for ambiguity, however,
is based on a tradeoff between competing values, and where we draw the
line is open to debate. The risks in raising the Who Question does not mean
we should give up and accept the quadrangle as a fait accompli. Even if
India’s methodology is not the answer to our Who Question, it might have
more modest uses. And if we can’t agree on a single answer, we should at
least think about who should be making the decisions.
A.

India Revisited—à la Carte

Although we may reject India’s approach as an alternative to
Croson, there remain features of the Indian model that we could benefit
from adopting with respect to definitional issues.

Croson’s disparity

analyses remains a black box whose output is only as reliable as the data we
input. Measuring underrepresentation using our current categories does not
tell us much because these categories are not narrowly tailored to answer
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the questions we ask of them. India’s example offers several ways the
status quo could be improved.
For example, even if we continue to count heads under an
underrepresentation model, it would not hurt to follow the Indian practice of
disaggregating categories to their logical limit. Where underrepresentation
is measured on a national scale, it makes no sense to collect data using only
a few broad categories.311 Even in local contexts, where particular ethnic
groups have a strong presence and a distinct identity, cities should consider
counting them separately where possible.312
Working with narrower categories would minimize definitional
ambiguities: It’s much easier to agree on who is Iberian or Argentinean
than who is Hispanic, as national origin provides a stable reference point.313
Counting with smaller units would also permit more narrowly-tailored
remedies to be drawn, preventing Iberians from usurping benefits at the
expense of Puerto-Ricans.

Some universities already make such

distinctions. The University of Hawaii targets only selected Asian Pacific
subgroups for diversity admissions. Stanford limits Hispanic eligibility to
Chicanos and Puerto Ricans.314 Such practices should be expanded.
This is not to deny the relevance of broader racial identities or to
attempt to replace race with ethnicity.315 It is simply to recognize that race
311

Incredibly, the federal government’s most recent disparity study did not even bother
to disaggregate that far. See Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal
Procurement, 61 Fed Reg 26,042 (May 23, 1996) (calculating underrepresentation of
“minorities” as a single masse).
312
In other words, choose the narrowest categories of ethnic identity to which the
sociopathology of stereotyping and discrimination might conceivably be responsive and for
which statistically meaningful results can be obtained.
313
There would admittedly still be definitional challenges posed by multiples
migrations. Cf. Bennun, 941 F.2d at 173. However, such inevitable controversies can be
resolved on a case by case basis.
314
Brest & Oshige, supra note xx, at 892-93.
315
Data compiled based on subgroups can always be reconstituted to provide a picture
of the larger group.
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itself is contextually contingent and that the salient contours of racial
identity vary.

Disaggregation would challenge the assumption that the

quadrangle represents the only organizing paradigm by which race can be
viewed, undermining monolithic assumptions about racial identities and
perhaps helping us to transcend them.
India’s example also underscores the importance of attentiveness to
societal context.316 Affirmative action categories should reflect patterns of
regional disadvantage, even if this means departing from quadrangular
conventions.317 French-Acadians have a history in Louisana that justifies
distinguishing them from Whites. Likewise, counting Native Hawaiians
separately makes sense in Hawaii.

Even non-ethnic groups such as

Appalachian Whites may deserve special attention.
Finally, there is no reason why such categories could not be
informed by empirical data of the sort India relies on. New York’s dilemma
over whether to count Iberians as Hispanic is one that countless other
jurisdictions continue to face: deciding who qualifies as a “minority.” An
empirical approach, even if imperfect, could provide a metric to draw
definitional lines that would at least be preferable to relying on the
uninformed intuition of judges and federal bureaucrats.318
Iberians represent an easy case being as much European as Hispanic.
However, it’s time to challenge presumptions of affirmative action
eligibility that turn solely upon “non-White” status.

Particularly in

economic contexts such as public contracting, there seems little justification
for awarding blanket preference to socio-economic overachievers such as
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Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (context matters in racial equality cases).
See EDLEY, supra note xx, at 175
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East and South Asians.319 This is not to deny that even successful minority
groups face instances of racial prejudice. Yet, existing discrimination law
affords them retrospective relief.320 The extraordinary remedy of voluntary
affirmative action should be reserved for those who face more intractable
racial barriers. Only persistent ingrained racism provides a justification for
acting proactively as well as a principled basis for privileging this form of
“diversity” over all others.
That said, relying on Indian methodology to definitively identify
subordinated groups may be impractical. A more modest goal would be to
rely on societal data to rule out groups which are clearly not being “held
back” on account of race and focus on those which might be. Thus, rather
than making societal disadvantage the sole determinant of eligibility, as in
India, such societal selection would serve only as a threshold test to refine
the categories we count with in particular contexts. By constructing racial
categories confined to at least plausibly disadvantaged minority groups, we
would make more tenable Croson’s blind equation of underrepresentation
with discrimination.321
Such socio-economic analyses need not culminate in a formalized
set of rankings, nor be treated as dispositive. Indeed, the problem with
India’s approach may have as much to do with its reliance on high-profile,
winner-takes-all contests as with its underlying aims. As a starting point,
319

See, e.g. Timothy Bates, The Changing Nature of Minority Business: A
Comparative Analysis of Asian, Nonminority, and Black-Owned Businesses, 18 REV.
BLACK POLI ECON. 25, supra note xx at 26 (1989) (“Asians are not a disadvantaged group:
their eligibility for government minority business set-aside[s] . . . is completely
inappropriate”).
320
The mere possibility of discrimination seems inadequate to support a presumption
of entitlement. Arab-Americans also face discrimination; so do Hasidic Jews. But these
groups are generally denied affirmative action. How are Indian-Americans any different?
321
Indeed, we already make such distinctions. If tomorrow Swedish contactors
happened to be found statistically underrepresented in New York, a court would think long
and hard before presuming discrimination from such prima facie evidence because
Swedish are not seen as a racially subordinated group. There seems no reason to award
such a presumption to other highly successful minority groups.
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we could begin merely by making sure we gather the necessary data broken
down by subgroup and funding social science research to interpret it. Such
research should also examine more carefully the links between immigration
and ethnic disadvantage to help control for “immigration effects” and
enable a more meaningful debate on immigrant participation in affirmative
action.322

Policy responses to the findings that emerge could then be

determined on a program by program basis.
All of these steps would serve to alleviate the “narrow tailoring”
concerns that judges have increasingly raised as constitutional roadblocks to
affirmative action. We’ve been painting our racial landscape in primary
colors for too long. It’s time to take a more chromatically differentiated
view which takes note of the ever more diverse spectrum of hues
represented in our citizenry. India’s example offers a useful starting point
to accomplish this.
B.

Who Decides the Who Question?

This Article has suggested ways that our current approach could be
improved. However, perhaps the more pressing question is to think about
how we might get there and, in particular, whether change can be better
achieved through law or politics. In other words, who should decide the
Who Question? Here too, India offers an instructive example.
There is a natural tendency to constitutionalize equality issues.323
Recent case law suggests this process is well under way for the Who
Question.

Constitutionalizing the Who Question means vesting key

decisions

with

courts,

restricting

322

the

license

for

institutional

See Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants: The Unintended
Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES, at 54-55 (noting dearth of scholarly analysis or
empirical data exploring connections between immigration and affirmative action).
323
Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Shaw v. Reno. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Indeed,
some argue there is a tendency in America to constitutionalize every contentious issue.
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experimentation and increasing the demand for precision and clarity. Yet,
as this Article has suggested, searching for a single, definitive answer in this
manner might prove infeasible and/or unwise.
In an ideal world, individual affirmative action programs would
tailor their answers to their specific needs in an evolutionary process that
would permit a new consensus on race to emerge organically.324 There is
some suggestion of such incremental change.

As Rocco Luiere bears

witness, the meaning of “Hispanic” is being challenged by a new Latino
identity that excludes Iberians and is more overtly “racial” than “ethnic.”325
A similar effort can be seen in the emerging distinction between “AfroAmericans”—the “original” African-American descendents of former
slaves—and Black immigrant groups.326
Yet, such departures from quadrangular orthodoxy remain more the
exception than the rule. While Pacific-Islanders may have won Census
recognition as an independent group, most affirmative action programs still
lump them together with other Asians. Without external prompting, such
programs have little incentive to change as adherence to quadrangular
orthodoxy remains the path of least resistance.327 Efforts to dislodge any of
the established groups from their privileged position have met fierce
resistance.328 Such changes as do occur may be more politically motivated
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Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (2001); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
325
See Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Birth of a ‘Latino Race,’ LOS ANGELES TIMES,
December 29, 2004, at B11 (describing a growing trend among Latinos to identify as a
distinct race).
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Patterson, supra note xx.
327
See supra notes xxx.
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See id.; LaNoue & Sullivan, supra note xx, at 441 (relating anecdote about
proposed removal of Asian-Americans and Indians from list of “official minorities”—
nobody disagreed on the merits, but the Chairman was “unwilling to take the political heat
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Croson studies that get the “wrong” answer).
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than based on objective merits.329 Affirmative action is not supposed to be
an ethnic spoils system. Yet, the political economy of ethnic identities
clearly operates in a far from optimal manner.
There is therefore a case for a “market regulator” in the form of
legal compulsion. By forcing the Who Question under the rubric of strict
scrutiny, courts have challenged the complacency of the status quo. As we
have seen, such judicial skepticism has taken many different avenues,
exposing the quadrangle’s flaws on many levels.330
Yet, such criticism often fails to acknowledge the inherent difficulty
of conforming ambiguous and subjective questions of racial identity to
precise judicial standards. Race is messy. To normalize it within fixed
categories, you have to impose an artificial rigidity on what are inherently
fluid identities.331 Such arbitrary decisions are not the sort of thing that can
be easily justified under heightened standards of scrutiny.332 Moreover, as
Justice Powell noted, courts are not institutionally suited to perform such
“variable sociological analyses.”333
This Article has suggested several reasons to refrain before pushing
the Who Question too far. The “identities market” may be imperfect, but a
judicially mandated “command and control” approach could do more harm
than good. However, even if we agreed to consign the Who Question to the
realm of politics, it is difficult to see how such a laissez faire model can be
squared with current constitutional doctrine. When it comes to race, the
Court has made it clear that the Equal Protection Clause has no tolerance for
329

See supra notes xx.
See supra notes xx.
331
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(making similar argument regarding classification of identities in general).
332
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333
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“the product of rough compromise struck by contending groups within the
democratic process.”334
The Who Question is thus caught in a catch-22.

While courts

remain loathe to tackle the imponderables of race and are ill-equipped to do
so, strict scrutiny permits little leeway for them to defer to anybody else.
The Supreme Court appears to deal with this problem primarily through
avoidance and indirection. Many lower courts have been similar equivocal
and ambivalent.335 Yet, as courts more ideologically hostile to affirmative
action begin to tackle the Who Question in earnest, the irreconcilable
ambiguities of race are becoming dangerously exposed.336
Fortunately, the dichotomy between “law” and “politics” need not
be as stark as current doctrine suggests. India offers an alternative that
bridges the two extremes. Courts are hardly the only institutional actors
qualified to administer a rule-based regime. India’s approach to the Who
Question instead emphasizes an administrative model. Although the Indian
Supreme Court remains an active protagonist in shaping constitutional
doctrine governing caste reservations, the Court has recognized that the
selection of affirmative action beneficiaries is primarily a political decision.
It has confined the role of the judiciary to articulating the principles that
bound the exercise of political discretion and ensure that the selection
process is conducted in an objective, transparent manner, pursuant to
established standards.337
There is already a precedent for this kind of intermediate approach
334
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336
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within the US equal protection case law on race-conscious voter districting,
which itself represents the political equivalent of affirmative action.338 The
US Supreme Court has recognized that drawing election districts is a
political exercise in which courts should hesitate to intervene.339 To ensure
this discretion is respected, the Court has declared that the consideration of
race in drawing of district boundaries will not automatically render such
decisions suspect.340 Instead, the Court will apply strict scrutiny only where
racial considerations so override “traditional districting principles” that a
racial gerrymander becomes manifest.341
US courts could undertake a similar role with respect to the Who
Question—requiring only that affirmative action categories be chosen
through a transparent process and conform to “categorical tailoring”
principles, analogous to traditional districting. Judicial interventions would
be justified only when the results are manifestly inconsistent with these
basic guidelines or otherwise exhibit indicia of favoritism.342 Such tailoring
principles could be developed in common law fashion through experience.
As a starting point, some of the suggestions this Article has made could be
adopted: e.g. requiring disaggregation into subcategories where feasible,
eliminating “forward” subgroups, controlling for immigration effects, and
338

Farber, supra note xx, at 924 (describing efforts to create majority minority districts
to boost election of minority candidates); cf. Jenkins, supra note xx, at 756 (describing
quotas for political representation as part of Indian affirmative action). Both raceconscious districting and affirmative action involve classifications used to sort participants
(voters or beneficiaries) into discrete categories based on their affiliation with an identified
community. The key difference with districting is that it operates on a facially race-neutral
basis: Voters are assigned to a district based on their residence, a criterion that may be
only indirectly linked to ethnicity. However, the Supreme Court has held that racial
gerrymanders, where sufficiently blatant, can be deemed equivalent to facial classifications
by race. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995).
339
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1993).
340
Miller, 515 U.S. at 905.
341
Id. (identifying such principles as compactness, contiguity, and respect for existing
communities)
342
Cf. Jana-Rock, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 4050 at *46 (scrutinizing construction of
Hispanic category for signs of favoritism).
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focusing on regional context.343 Courts have already begun to tinker with
several such steps.344 This proposal would merely unify their efforts under
a coherent doctrinal rationale.

As with the voter districting cases, the

substance and scope of such judicial review might prove erratic, although
perhaps no worse than the present status quo. In any case, this Article has
already suggested that when it comes to the Who Question, there are
benefits to ambiguity as well as costs.345

IV.

Conclusion
Affirmative action in the US has avoided the Who Question for too

long.

We continue to count heads using outdated and overinclusive

categories without thinking about what we are doing or why.

Non-

disadvantaged groups such as Iberians benefit from affirmative action,
while Samoans and Laotians are denied admission to college because there
are “too many Asians.” More is at stake here than just somebody’s job,
contract, or university slot. Racial equality remains a core moral issue in
this country.

And the construction of affirmative action categories is

freighted with issues of personal identity whose outcome will determine
how we think of ourselves as a people. Therefore, if we are going to
continue to do affirmative action by the numbers, it’s worth thinking about
counting the ones that matter most.
As courts increasingly force the issue under the rubric of strict
scrutiny, shades of gray on questions of color can no longer be papered
over. Yet, such cases also demonstrate that we lack the doctrinal and
343

See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
See supra notes xx and accompanying text.
345
Cf. Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1315-16 (describing benefits of Supreme Court’s
“casuistical, rule-free, fact-specific course in the context of affirmative action” as
simultaneously provoking public debate through incremental rulings while leaving space
for democratic resolution of underlying issues).
344
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methodological tools to tackle this problem. India offers an alternative
model that we can usefully consider before continuing down this road, both
to emulate—and to avoid.
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